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USING DATA EXCLUSIVITY GRANTS  
TO INCENTIVIZE CUMULATIVE 
INNOVATION OF BIOLOGICS’ 
MANUFACTURING PROCESSES 
ERIC LAWRENCE LEVI* 
The pharmaceutical market is divided into two types of compounds:  small-
molecule chemical compounds and large-molecule biologics.  Due to biologics’ 
molecular sizes and the current scientific state of biologics manufacturing, 
manufacturing facilities and processes require frequent reassessment to ensure 
production of safe, pure, and potent therapeutics.  Manufacturers utilize 
patent and drug regulatory law to protect their investments and 
simultaneously signal where innovation and investment are lacking.  The 
current four- and twelve-year regimented structures of the Biologics Price, 
Competition, and Innovation Act do not keep pace with scientific development; 
biologics manufacturing processes drift with time, and if a manufacturer can 
obtain a higher degree of process control, then it should not feel restricted to 
wait until their exclusivity period lapses.  Currently, the FDA rarely grants 
market exclusivity privileges for manufacturing process improvements alone; 
hence, manufacturing processes—or at least large portions thereof—are 
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typically withheld as trade secrets or strategically claimed within companion 
composition claims.  As a result, significant opportunity exists in regulatory 
framework to incentivize the research and development of biologics 
manufacturing processes.  By creating a one- to four-year data exclusivity 
extension opportunity, manufacturers will feel more comfortable reinvesting 
their returns on investment towards manufacturing efficiency, and 
manufacturers can capitalize on the complex-molecule nature of their biologic. 
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“We try to remember that medicine is for the patient.  We try never to forget 
that medicine is for the people.  It is not for the profits.  The profits follow, and 
if we have remembered that, they have never failed to appear. The better we 
have remembered it, the larger they have been.” 
—George W. Merck1 
INTRODUCTION 
Medical innovation continues to skyrocket, giving us artificial 
hearts, medical imaging software, advanced prosthetics controllable 
with the mind, and pharmacological cures for a plethora of 
dangerous diseases.2  Notwithstanding our great strides to curtail 
certain genetic and biologic maladies, cancer and rare diseases in 
their various forms continue to proliferate.3  Legislators and 
regulators thus seek to incentivize this type of dramatic innovation 
while controlling patient costs and ensuring access to medicines. 
This Comment attempts to explain and offer solutions for how 
patent and drug regulatory law address—or fail to address—
commercialization and manufacturing inefficiencies when there are 
high barriers to biopharmaceutical product entry, particularly in the 
context of biologics.  By working in tandem, patent law and drug 
regulations signal to the next generation of scientists, manufacturers, 
                                               
 1. MEDICINE IS FOR THE PATIENT, NOT FOR THE PROFITS 11 (1950). 
 2. For example, Crizotinib, a drug formed from living cells and carrying a price 
tag of $50,000 per treatment, has been hailed as a miracle drug.  It has 
singlehandedly eradicated certain subtypes of lung cancer once thought terminal in 
patients.  AUSTL. DEP’T OF HEALTH, CRIZOTINIB, 200 MG CAPSULE, 60 AND 250 MG 
CAPSULE, 60, XALKORI®, PFIZER AUSTRALIA PTY LTD. 5 (Mar. 2014), 
http://www.pbs.gov.au/industry/listing/elements/pbac-meetings/psd/2014-03/criz 
otinib-psd-03-2014.pdf. 
For a discussion of the potential revolutionary impact of a gene editing technique, 
CRISPR/Cas9, and how it is now being utilized in laboratories, see Yannis 
Grammatikakis, Next Big Thing in Genome Modification:  The CRISPR/Cas9 System, NAT’L 
INSTS. HEALTH (Apr. 20, 2015), https://irp.nih.gov/blog/post/2015/04/next-big-
thing-in-genome-modification-the-crispr-cas9-system; Thom Patterson, Unproven 
Medical Technique Could Save Countless Lives, Billions of Dollars, CNN (Oct. 30, 2015, 
7:28 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/30/health/pioneers-crispr-dna-genome-editing. 
 3. Stacey Simon, Cancer Statistics Report:  Death Rate down 23% in 21 Years, AM. 
CANCER SOC’Y (Jan. 7, 2016), http://www.cancer.org/cancer/news/news/cancer-
statistics-report-death-rate-down-23-percent-in-21-years. 
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regulators, and business leaders where innovation and investment are 
lacking, encouraging smart innovation and investment.  Designing 
biological products requires extensive investment and up-front 
development costs; similarly, biologics manufacturers require more 
process control compared to their small-molecule counterparts. 
Therefore, so that manufacturers produce cheaper, safer, and 
more effective biologic and biosimilar cancer and rare-disease 
therapies (a.k.a. biobetters),4 Congress should provide greater 
incentive for manufacturing process innovation, disclosure, and 
societal health impact projections than those currently offered by the 
Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA).5  Because 
small changes in biologics manufacturing processes require extensive 
comparability testing,6 manufacturers focus on comparing and 
mimicking biological products within tight preexisting constraints 
rather than developing and proving societal health benefits ancillary 
to manufacturing innovation.7  These alternative processes can result 
                                               
 4. See Mark McCamish & Gillian Woollett, The State of the Art in the Development of 
Biosimilars, 91 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 405, 405 (2012) (finding 
that altering earlier manufacturing processes empowers developers to evaluate prior 
biologics and commercialize a higher-quality and more cost-effective drug).  
Biobetters encourage manufacturing efficiency, new therapeutic uses, and lower 
consumer costs.  Competitive Strategies in Life Sciences:  Biobetters Versus Biosimilars, 
FINANCIER WORLDWIDE (Nov. 2011) [Hereinafter Biobetters Versus Biosimilars], 
https://www.financierworldwide.com/competitive-strategies-in-life-sciences-biobetter 
s-versus-biosimilars (“[B]iobetter[s] will show improvement in one or more attributes 
over the original biologic, for example, in the form of a better side effect profile, faster 
action, lower dosing, or different form of delivery.”).  These precision medications will 
simultaneously respond quicker to stimuli, minimize safety risks associated with 
immunological responses, and drive down production and consumer costs.  See Helen 
Roe, The Rise of Biosimilars in Cancer Care, 24 BRITISH J. NURSING S28, S29 (Oncology Supp. 
2015) (illustrating how biosimilars can be designed for different tumor groups, when 
previously there would have been only one drug for all). 
 5. Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA) was enacted as part 
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 7001–
7003, 124 Stat. 119, 804–21 (2010). 
 6. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., DRAFT GUIDANCE:  
COMPARABILITY PROTOCOLS FOR HUMAN DRUGS AND BIOLOGICS:  CHEMISTRY, 
MANUFACTURING, AND CONTROLS INFORMATION 1, 3–4 (2016), http://www.fda.gov/down 
loads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM496611.pdf. 
 7. Biologics and biosimilars—a regulated and discrete technology—have not 
developed into a statistically significant data set required to evaluate manufacturers’ 
specific focus, but “products of discrete technology industries [that] tend not to 
comprise integral components of some larger product or system . . . [and generally] 
do not enable the development of a wide array of ancillary products.”  Robert P. 
 
ELEVI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/2017  6:37 PM 
2017] INCENTIVIZING BIOLOGICS INNOVATION 915 
in anything from clinically tested child dosing regimens8 to brand-
new therapeutic uses,9 illustrating how manufacturing processes can 
deliver return on investment (ROI) or fail to recoup costs.  But 
innovators currently lack adequate incentives to develop and protect 
subsequent biologic manufacturing process improvements because 
the data and market exclusivity periods set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 262 
are insufficient for an originator biologic manufacturer to (1) recoup 
its initial investment and (2) develop, test, and patent biobetter 
processes.  By examining and correcting these deficiencies, and by 
offering a more flexible regulatory scheme rather than a one-size-fits-
all paradigm, the signaling and notice functions inherent in patent 
and drug regulatory law will guide the next generation of innovators 
and corporations toward smarter investing in the biologics 
manufacturing improvements that best improve societal health. 
Biologics manufacturing processes create unique opportunities for 
sponsors and manufacturers to leverage existing patent rights and 
obtain justified exclusivity while enhancing societal health.  To best 
allow manufacturers to take advantage of these opportunities, 
legislative corrections must be made whereby the governmental grant 
of exclusivity built into the BPCIA would require showing projected 
societal health impact.  Additionally, the societal impact should 
correspond with a tiered market exclusivity system such that 
manufacturers maintain the incentive to conduct further research 
and development (R&D) on existing rights while pursuing opportune 
protection of any supplemental high-quality innovation.  The recent 
                                               
Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. 
REV. 839, 880–81 (1990). 
 8. 42 U.S.C. § 262(m) provides a pathway for approval of child dosing regimens, 
but manufacturers should have the incentive to pursue these regimens on their own 
accord while attempting to enhance manufacturability, thereby lowering risk 
financial risk with multiple facets of potential protection and exclusivity.  See W. 
Nicholson Price II, Innovation Policy Failures in the Manufacturing of Drugs, in FDA IN 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:  THE CHALLENGES OF REGULATING DRUGS AND NEW 
TECHNOLOGIES 354–55 (Holly Fernandez Lynch & I. Glenn Cohen eds., 2015) 
[hereinafter Price, Innovation Policy Failures] (arguing that the FDA’s role in 
encouraging pediatric studies could also be used to encourage innovative 
manufacturing methodology). 
 9. See Biobetters Versus Biosimilars, supra note 4 (“Depending on the process to 
create biobetters, the platform may also be applicable to more than one product, 
thus saving substantial development dollars,” as was the case for Aranesp, launched 
prior to the expiration of original patents covering EPO). 
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decision in Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc.10 and the pending litigation of 
AbbVie Inc. v. Amgen Inc.11 illustrate the serious concern reference 
product sponsors (“RPS”) have for obtaining and maintaining market 
exclusivity—these barriers for follow-on biologics (“FOB”) 
manufacturers must be predictable and valuable whenever an 
applicant seeks market and data exclusivity.  The inherent value of 
biologics manufacturing processes will either be disclosed for public 
knowledge or concealed as a trade secret, exemplifying the trade-offs 
in the patent-or-trade-secret dichotomy.12  Increased disclosure of 
firms’ biologics manufacturing processes—both by biosimilar and RPS 
applicants—will enhance biological agent efficacy, purity, and safety 
across the industry.  Furthermore, as scientific understanding of 
biologics moves “from [a] reductionistic understanding of biochemical 
pathways to organism-level models[, a bridge will be built] between 
current empirical methods of drug candidate evaluation and new 
models of drug development.”13  Therapeutic treatments are impacted 
by both the unique characteristics of biologics manufacturing 
processes and recent judicial decisions, illustrating that 
biopharmaceuticals should be the most innovative and scientifically 
current methodology for personal and precise therapeutic care.14 
By rewarding manufacturers for their enhanced process knowledge 
with a tiered data exclusivity system,15 manufacturers will re-invest in 
drug quality, efficacy, and safety improvements while passing on 
lower costs to consumers.16  The shorter yet predictable FDA data 
exclusivity grants are best capable of incentivizing biologics 
manufacturers to innovate and disclose improved manufacturing 
methodology because of the constant refinement and reassessment 
inherent in biologics manufacturing.  In the rare disease market, 
where competition is often sparse, innovators require additional 
                                               
 10. 827 F.3d 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 591 (2016) (holding 
FOB sponsors must provide 180-day notice of commercial marketing to the RPS, 
after approval of their FOB but prior to marketing the FOB). 
 11. Complaint, AbbVie Inc. v. Amgen Inc., No. 16-666-SLR (D. Del. Aug. 4, 2016). 
 12. See infra Part IV. 
 13. J. Woodcock, “Precision” Drug Development?, 99 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & 
THERAPEUTICS 152, 153 (2016). 
 14. See Innovation Saves, BIOTECHNOLOGY INNOVATION ORG., 
http://innovationsaves.life (last visited Feb. 5, 2017) (describing how innovation in 
biologics saves lives and money). 
 15. Price, Innovation Policy Failures, supra note 8, at 343, 354–55 (correlating 
manufacturing design changes with innovative value). 
 16. Woodcock, supra note 13, at 153. 
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incentive to improve their manufacturing processes because there is 
less fear of competitor FOB manufacturers utilizing a more efficient 
or efficacious manufacturing process.17  For biologics and biosimilars 
to capture market share quicker, customers and clinicians must view 
the incremental advantages of biologics over small-molecules as 
worthwhile given the price difference; therefore, innovator biologics 
manufacturers should have the first opportunity—before the 
conclusion of market exclusivity—to provide scientific data 
supporting the therapeutic value of their medications compared to 
any small- or large-molecule drugs. 
This would advance BPCIA’s two-fold mission:  (1) providing 
sufficient incentives for continuous innovation in biologic therapies 
(i.e., promoting innovation) and (2) lowering the price of biologic 
therapies (i.e., promoting accessibility),18 as well as the Constitutional 
goal of “promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful Arts” for 
societal benefit.19  Innovative value and public accessibility go hand-
in-hand when determining price.  Because biologics manufacturers 
possess first-hand biologics-process-based scientific knowledge of 
safety, efficacy, and potency, they can project societal health 
improvements relatively accurately. 
Similarly, the value of biopharmaceutical therapeutics change as 
scientific knowledge develops.  Justifying exorbitant prices for a 
single pharmaceutical becomes harder as generics and FOBs respond 
to market demands and statutory exclusivities or patent grants expire.  
Thus, recurring opportunities for biologics manufacturers to leverage 
previous grants and obtain an additional FDA grant of data exclusivity 
or PTO patent grant will lower biologics prices; even though 
exclusivity lends itself to short-term price hikes, greater flexibility 
enables greater efficiency as grants enable drug prices to closely track 
the actual need and demand of the drug.20  Lower prices will make 
                                               
 17. Carefully calibrated data exclusivity periods can identify and reward socially 
beneficial investment.  Sarah Sorscher, Note, A Longer Monopoly for Biologics?:  
Considering the Implications of Data Exclusivity as a Tool for Innovation Policy, 23 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 285, 302 (2009).  Furthermore, sponsors can pursue patent grants to target areas 
not covered by data exclusivity.  Vincent J. Roth, Will FDA Data Exclusivity Make Biologic 
Patents Passé?, 29 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 249, 249 (2013). 
 18. Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 7001(b), 
124 Stat. 119, 804 (2010) (“It is the sense of the Senate that a biosimilars pathway 
balancing innovations and consumer interests [i.e., accessibility] should be established.”). 
 19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 20. Enabling more “smaller steps” in exclusivity grants achieves the lowest 
possible price in the long run, as opposed to twelve-year leaps, which will keep 
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the market accessible to more customers while incentivizing high-
quality innovation that more accurately reflects market forces and 
needs rather than arbitrary legislative grants, allowing the new 
biological products marketplace to adapt and keep pace alongside 
scientific advancements in biologics manufacturing processes. 
Part I of this Comment illustrates how biological products capture 
market share and sets up how drug regulatory law may be used as a lever 
to adjust incentives to promote disclosure of biologics manufacturing 
processes.  Part II examines FDA requirements for grants of exclusivity 
and how biosimilars subsequently gain market approval.  Part III 
analyzes the trade-offs between patents and trade secrets under 35 
U.S.C. § 112’s claim scope disclosure requirements.  Part IV applies 
property law to the biologics and biosimilars abbreviated pathway 
framework to assess current manufacturing process protection risks and 
opportunities.  Subsequently, Congress should create a tiered data 
exclusivity system because biologic-specific FDA grants of data exclusivity 
and early investments in improving patented processes enhance drug 
quality and more accurately reflect the realities of a complex and ever-
changing scientific and financial landscape. 
I. THE INCREASING BIOLOGICAL PRODUCT MARKET SHARE 
Eliminating cancer cell-by-cell may seem like an impossible task, 
but what if an army of tiny, “incredibly sophisticated killing 
machines”21 are grown to bear the brunt of that work?  Indeed, 
                                               
overall biopharma prices higher, long-term.  The assumptions inherent in exclusivity 
indirectly curing high price include:  (1) the innovator discloses sufficient 
information to incentivize high quality follow-on biologics manufacturing processes, 
(2) the innovator has an incentive to adapt and perfect their current biologics 
manufacturing processes, and (3) biologics (and the exclusivities which facilitate 
novel medicine market growth) in the long run will be cheaper for consumers than 
their small molecules.  Thus, getting the most societally beneficial biologics approved 
and into the market quicker in order to pave the way for biosimilars and other new 
biologics, will lead to lower health-care costs. 
With greater flexibility comes great efficiency—i.e., grants are proportional to the 
innovation.  In some cases, it may lead to higher drug prices when warranted, but for 
the most part it will more closely track the actual need and demand of the drug, 
while conforming to a less artificial, one-size-fits-all regulatory model.  Twelve to 
twelve-and-a-half years makes little sense for some incremental advancement; but for 
a major advancement, it could be paramount. 
 21. On Assignment:  Hacking Cancer, NBC NEWS (May 20, 2016, 8:14 AM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/widget/video-embed/690231363507 (quote appears at 
3:35 in video). 
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biopharmaceuticals—or biologics22—allow clinicians to create 
personalized and precise therapeutic plans of attack for cancer and 
cancer-causing agents.  “The importance of biologics lies in their 
structural and functional variety,” enabling clinicians and pharmacists 
to treat diseases not effectively treated with small-molecule drugs.23  
But sophistication and complexity come with a high price tag, 
increased health risks, and more stringent regulatory standards.  
These barriers to innovation and biopharmaceutical market entry are 
balanced with Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) grants of patent 
rights as well as two types of Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
grants of valuable innovator exclusivity—a statutory grant of market 
and data exclusivity through the BPCIA.24  Traditional 
patent exclusivities prevent FOB manufacturers from using, selling, 
or importing the patented biologic25—effectively granting the right to 
exclude others from the market by suing for huge damages awards—
while data exclusivities prevent FOB manufacturers from using the 
RPS’s clinical trial data when submitting an abbreviated biologicals 
license application (aBLA) and market exclusivities preclude the FDA 
from approving an aBLA.  Essentially, data exclusivity inhibits the 
development of FOB manufacturing processes and 
market exclusivity prevents the FDA from approving an FOB, 
prolonging FOB market entry. 
Most biologics manufacturers will take advantage of redundancies in 
exclusivity grants.  Because manufacturers pursue safe, efficacious, and 
pure biologics to gain approval by the FDA, they often develop 
                                               
 22. Kate S. Gaudry, Exclusivity Strategies and Opportunities in View of the Biologics 
Price Competition and Innovation Act, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 587, 587 (2011) (explaining 
that biological products, biologies, or “[b]iologics are a class of drugs or vaccines that 
are produced by manipulating a living tissue or microorganism”). 
 23. Yaniv Heled, Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities in Biological Pharmaceuticals—Do 
We Really Need Both?, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 419, 422 n.4 (2012). 
 24. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7) (2012).  For an in-depth look at the legislative history 
outlining developments of the biologics and biosimilars pathway, illustrating 
bargaining between generics, innovators, and the FDA, see generally Krista Hessler 
Carver et al., An Unofficial Legislative History of the Biologics Price Competition and 
Innovation Act of 2009, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 671 (2010). 
 25. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 271(a) (2012).  These patent exclusivities can be worth 
billions of dollars.  See, e.g., Christopher Yasiejko & Susan Decker, Merck Wins Record 
$2.5 Billion Patent Verdict Against Gilead, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 15, 2016, 4:30 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-12-15/gilead-told-to-pay-merck-2-
54-billion-in-hepatitis-c-royalties (reporting that a jury awarded Merck & Co. $2.5 
billion, which is the equivalent of ten percent royalties, based on Gilead Science’s use 
of its patented drug compound to treat hepatitis C). 
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biological compounds in conjunction with manufacturing processes that 
are ripe for patenting.  Thus, innovators can earn statutory exclusivity 
for biologics testing data for twelve to twelve and a half years as well as 
patent portfolio rights (i.e., active patent life) for the biological 
compound and/or manufacturing process coextensively, where patent 
protection may extend five to eleven months longer.26  Still, with 
biologics development times generally running longer than those of 
traditional single-molecule drugs, the data exclusivity will oftentimes 
exceed patent exclusivity for the innovative new chemical entity or 
process of which the manufacturer received patent protection. 
To advance biologics manufacturing processes at a rate consistent 
with rapid scientific development, legislation must encourage 
biologics manufacturers, in the form of biologics licenses and patent 
rights, to pursue regulatory approval more often.  These more 
frequent quid pro quo disclosure opportunities—supported by showing 
improvement to societal health—should change current regime 
trends:  innovator biologics companies should disclose scientific 
knowledge about their biologics manufacturing processes more 
frequently than once at the beginning of their twelve-year market 
exclusivity period or (generally) twenty-year patent grant unless the 
societal health improvement is so substantial that a four-year data 
exclusivity and twelve-year market exclusivity period is justified.  As 
biologic originators’ exclusivity periods expire, biosimilars (and in 
the future, interchangeables) manufacturers similarly disclose bare 
minimum manufacturing process knowledge, as they rely on safety 
and effectiveness clinical-trial data from the RPS.27  By legislatively 
creating a tiered data exclusivity system within 42 U.S.C. 
§ 262(k)(7)(B), whereby the Secretary accepts an additional data 
exclusivity application from the originator prior to the expiration of 
their previously granted data exclusivity period, biologic 
manufacturing process knowledge will grow alongside scientific 
development; for both the original data exclusivity grant and 
                                               
 26. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7); Heled, supra note 23, at 423–24.  Professor Yaniv 
Heled provides a compelling case study and graphical depiction, illustrating when 
initial research and development on a biologics begins, demonstrating how typical 
patent terms and exclusivity periods overlap.  Id. at 449. 
 27. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(2) (detailing the requirements to apply for licensure of 
biological products as a biosimilar); Gaudry, supra note 22, at 587, 592.  Compare 42 
U.S.C. § 262(k)(2) (relying on safety and effectiveness data for large-molecule 
biopharmaceutical drugs), with 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (relying on safety and effectiveness 
data for small-molecule chemical drugs). 
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subsequent data exclusivity application, the Secretary will 
determine—on a case-by-case basis—the appropriate one- to four-year 
data exclusivity period.  Ideally, the inefficiencies that plague small-
molecule originator and generics manufacturers will be minimized in 
the biologics and FOB manufacturing environment as more 
information is released in stages. 
Disclosing scientific advances has obvious pros and cons,28 but the 
ultimate question is whether the innovator feels he can obtain an ROI 
by capturing market share to set up prospective growth.29  When 
comparing a brand-name or generic small-molecule applicant with a 
biologics or biosimilar applicant, respectively, given the high rate of 
failure, there must be a significantly larger ROI than the “300 billion 
[dollars that was spent] on research and development (R&D) with 
such little improvement over the last twenty years in the life expectancy 
of patients.”30  Currently, biopharma has the highest rate of 
reinvestment in R&D of any U.S. industry—approximately nineteen 
percent.31  If product sponsors and manufacturers lower or reallocate 
                                               
 28. Manufacturing process transparency will allow firms to easily police 
manufacturing patents, which would in turn provide greater incentives to innovate.  
Price, Innovation Policy Failures, supra note 8, at 343, 354. 
 29. Potentially creating independent pathways to validate new technologies 
outside of the new drug application (NDA) and BLA process or creating new 
disclosure opportunities for biologics manufacturers would provide ROI viability 
options.  Id. at 353 (suggesting that establishing a market for innovative drug 
manufacturing technologies would provide additional disclosure incentives and 
economically enticing licensing schemes). 
 30. On Assignment:  Hacking Cancer, supra note 21 (quote appears at 7:39 in 
video); see also Els Torreele, Should Patents on Pharmaceuticals Be Extended to Encourage 
Innovation?, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405 
2970204542404577156993191655000 (showing that patent duration and scope have 
increased, and research-and-development spending has increased yet “new molecular 
entitles” have decreased forty-five percent since the late 1990s). 
 31. JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICA, HIGH VALUE, HIGH UNCERTAINTY:  MEASURING RISK IN 
BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND OTHER INDUSTRIES 12 (2014) 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Life-Science 
s-Health-Care/gx-lshc-measuring-risk-in-biopharmaceutical-research.pdf; see also 
PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., 2015 PROFILE:  BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH 
INDUSTRY 25 (2015), http://phrma-docs.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2015_ph 
rma_profile.pdf (explaining that biopharma invests “more than 13 times the amount 
of R&D per employee than manufacturing industries overall”); Michael Casey & 
Robert Hackett, The 10 Biggest R&D Spenders Worldwide, FORTUNE (Nov. 18, 2014, 8:45 
AM), http://fortune.com/2014/11/17/top-10-research-development (illustrating 
that two industries—health care and computers—account for half of all R&D 
investment); Innovation Saves, supra note 14 (describing the results of such heavy 
investment in R&D). 
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reinvestments toward R&D, inefficiencies will continue to plague the 
biopharmaceutical manufacturing process.  High-quality innovation, 
on the other hand, utilizes an originator’s scientific expertise to focus 
investments on manufacturing “drift” and inefficiency to ultimately 
create a more valuable consumer product.  Biologics manufacturing 
processes and their associated analytical tools are the backbone of 
innovation in the biological products market.  Because precision 
medications and rare disease treatments require high initial 
investment and occasionally expensive companion genetic testing, 
neither being properly incentivized within the BPCIA, the biological 
products landscape is poised for change. 
A. Defining Biological Products 
Biological products32 are at the forefront of biomedical research and 
are complex mixtures not easily identified or characterized.33  The 
FDA defines biological drugs as agents containing over forty amino 
acids manufactured in vivo—typically through recombinant DNA 
technology.34  Therefore, biologics are isolated from natural sources.35  
In time, biologics—coming from living precursors—may offer the most 
effective means to treat complex medical illnesses and conditions.36  
Their curative media include gene therapy, regenerative medicine, 
enzyme replacement,37 immune-oncology, precision medicine, 
                                               
 32. A biological product is defined as a “virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, 
antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic product, 
protein . . . or analogous product . . . applicable to the prevention, treatment, or cure 
of a disease or condition of human beings.”  42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(1). 
 33. W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Secrecy, 91 Wash. L. Rev. 1769, 1769 (2016) 
[hereinafter Price, Regulating Secrecy]  (“Biologics, which comprise the most innovate 
and expensive drugs today, are the path-dependent result of complex, secret 
manufacturing processes.”). 
 34. Lynne A. Bui et al., Key Considerations in the Preclinical Development of 
Biosimilars, DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY SUPPLEMENT, May 2015, at 3, 4. 
 35. Biologics “are produced and purified from living systems such as bacteria, 
yeast or mammalian cell lines.”  Id. at 3. 
 36. Bradford R. Hirsch & Gary H. Lyman, Biosimilars:  A Cure to the U.S. Health 
Care Cost Conundrum?, 28 BLOOD REVIEWS 263, 263 (2014); see also V. Strand & B. 
Cronstein, Biosimilars:  How Similar?, 44 INTERNAL MEDICINE J. 218, 218 (2014) (stating 
that monoclonal antibodies, soluble receptors, cell surface antigens, and co-
stimulation signals represent the “most complicated” of biologic agents). 
 37. The most common manner for production of therapeutic proteins is 
generally recombinant proteins produced by host cells.  Florian M. Wurm, Production 
of Recombinant Protein Therapeutics in Cultivated Mammalian Cells, 22 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 1393 (2004), http://www.nature.com/nbt/journal/v22/n11/full/ 
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vaccines, and other agents critical for maintenance of disease states 
including cancer and autoimmune diseases.38 
Because biologics are made from living organisms, the functional-, 
safety-, and efficacy-related properties of a biologic depend heavily on 
their manufacturing and processing conditions.39  A difference of one 
degree in manufacturing can lead to denatured proteins and 
ineffective treatments.  While biologics can harness the 
therapeutically useful aspects of naturally-occurring cellular 
responses, their manufacturability and batch-to-batch drift require a 
more complex and supervised examination.  This process is 
incredibly sensitive; small changes in extra-cellular matrix pressure, 
temperature, solubility, etc. undoubtedly affect cellular 
communications, rendering a biologic useless (and potentially 
dangerous) or efficacious.40 
While manufacturing processes attempt to mimic in vivo extra-cellular 
matrices, product variability with each subsequent batch is inevitable.  
Difficulties in classifying the proteins within a biologic and non-precise 
manufacturing processes mean that clinical assessments must approve of 
a process based on its precision41 rather than its accuracy.42 
                                               
nbt1026.html. 
 38. Innovation Saves, supra note 14; see also Charles L Bennet et al., Regulatory and 
Clinical Considerations for Biosimilar Oncology Drugs, 15 LANCET ONCOLOGY 594, 594 
(2014); Farah Huzair & Dinar Kale, Biosimilars and the Long Game, 33 TRENDS IN 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 250, 250 (2015); Merges & Nelson, supra note 7, at 905; Adam Ross 
& Kelly Richard, Biosimilars, 79 CONN. MED. 295, 295 (2015). 
 39. Bui et al., supra note 34, at 4 (“[B]iologics are proteins that are typically 
much larger than chemically synthesized small-molecule drugs, exhibit a high degree 
of structural complexity, including primary, secondary, tertiary and possibly 
quaternary structures, and are subject to post-translational modifications.”); see also 
Darren S. Tucker & Gregory F. Wells, Emerging Competition Issues Involving Follow-on 
Biologics, ANTITRUST, Fall 2014, at 100, 100 (noting that changing the manufacturing 
process could modify the product in ways that might not be detected, yet may alter 
safety or efficacy).  For an overview of the small-molecule drug versus large-molecule 
biologic divide, and how their characteristics and manufacturing conditions are 
inherently considered and contrasted in both the BPCIA and Hatch-Waxman Act, 
see generally Trevor Woodage, Blinded by (a Lack of) Science:  Limitations in Determining 
Therapeutic Equivalence of Follow-on Biologics and Barriers to Their Approval and 
Commercialization, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 9. 
 40. Bennet et al., supra note 38, at 599 (stating that changing immunogenicity 
profiles can be due to cell lines or media components, structural modifications, 
protein aggregation, suboptimum storage processes, and patient factors). 
 41. Precision refers to the closeness of two or more measurements to each other.  
Precision medicine and precision drug manufacturing go hand-in-hand.  “We are 
entering an era of precision medicine, when drugs must be made with unique 
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Originator biologics and biosimilar pharmaceuticals will inevitably 
gain market share.  However, if manufacturers continue to use the 
same manufacturing process for up to twelve and a half years of 
market exclusivity or twenty years from filing a patent application, the 
same drug shortage, recall, and overall inefficiency issues that plague 
the small-molecule pharmaceutical industry will consume the 
growing biopharmaceutical industry.43 
B. Biosimilars’ Movement into the Market Place 
“Biosimilar”44 is a term used to describe an FOB drug whose target is 
the same as that of the originator biologic, similar to the relationship 
between generics and brand name pharmaceuticals.45  Biosimilars are 
functional equivalents of an originator biologic and require less 
clinical trial data for approval.46  As biologics’ patents and exclusivity 
grants expire, biosimilars manufacturers have the opportunity to claim 
alternative or more efficient methods of manufacture. 
                                               
features” that are replicable by continuous manufacturing.  Lawrence Yu, Continuous 
Manufacturing Has a Strong Impact on Drug Quality, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.:  FDA 
VOICE (Apr. 12, 2016) http://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2016/04/continuo 
us-manufacturing-has-a-strong-impact-on-drug-quality. 
 42. Bui et al., supra note 34, at 3 (listing biosimilar development steps:  (1) 
“selection of an appropriate reference biologic,” (2) “understanding the key 
molecular attributes of that reference biologic,” and (3) “development of a 
manufacturing process to match these attributes of the reference biologic product”); 
see also W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, Are Trade Secrets Delaying Biosimilars?, 348 
SCI. 188, 188 (2015).  Accuracy measures how close a result (or process) tracks with 
the true, pre-determined value.  Accuracy ensures the repeatability of process 
parameters—and therefore products—in biologics manufacturing.  Jim Cahill, 
Accurate and Repeatable Measurements in Pharmaceutical and Biotech Manufacturing, 
EMERSON PROCESS MGMT. (Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.emersonprocessxperts.com/2016 
/03/accurate-and-repeatable-measurements-in-pharmaceutical-and-biotech-manufacturing. 
 43. For a complete list of FDA inspection citations, see Inspections Citations, U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN. (Sept. 2, 2016), http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/Inspections/ucm346077.htm. 
 44. See McCamish & Woollett, supra note 4, at 409 (explaining that changing 
manufacturing processes, whether by scaling or by creating a biosimilar, will slightly 
modify the structure and function of the resulting biomolecules, which is why these 
products are referred to as “biosimilar,” rather than “biogeneric” or “bioidentical”). 
 45. Id. at 405 (noting that biosimilars must meet strict requirements of quality 
and comparability to the originator biologic). 
 46. See Information for Industry (Biosimilars), FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/Developme 
ntApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/ApprovalApplications/Therape
uticBiologicApplications/Biosimilars/ucm241720.htm (last updated Jan. 12, 2017). 
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Currently, the hallmark of the biologics market is high price.47  
Biologics routinely cost consumers between $50,000 and $250,000 for 
a single year of treatment.48  But as biological products come off-
patent and their exclusivity periods expire, biosimilars will naturally 
capture market share49 without the systemic patent-cliff issues50 posed 
by the small-molecule generics market.51  Instead, the high cost of 
manufacturing and ensuring quality control will limit generic 
involvement regardless of patent protection, diminishing immediate 
competition and creating market-driven barriers on entry.  
Subsequent competition reinforces manufacturing efficiency and 
minimizes new investors’ risk.  Drugs represented ten to fourteen 
percent of American health-care costs in 2015,52 and increased 
competition threatened by and due to the biosimilars market offers 
customer savings of at least eight to ten billion dollars a year.53 
                                               
 47. Bennet et al., supra note 38, at 594 (“In 2016, half of the ten most expensive 
pharmaceuticals will be biologicals.”). 
 48. Tucker & Wells, supra note 39, at 100; see infra text accompanying note 76 (noting 
that biologics may cost greater than twenty times more than a small-molecule drug). 
 49. See G. Dranitsaris et al., Clinical Trial Design in Biosimilar Drug Development, 31 
INVESTIGATIONAL NEW DRUGS 479, 480–81 (2013) (noting that by 2017, $60 billion 
worth of brand biologicals will be coming off patent protection in developed 
countries); Roe, supra note 4, at S28 (suggesting that biosimilars are safe and 
effective alternatives particularly because of the regulatory stringency around 
development, manufacturing, and licensing); see also Strand & Cronstein, supra note 
36, at 218–19 (discussing the interest in producing biosimilars to counteract the 
“significant financial burden” of biologic therapies, which often limits their use to 
patients in wealthier countries). 
 50. Patent cliff issues refer to the fact that there are less small-molecule blockbuster 
drugs capable of being discovered, and as these drugs lose patent protection, market 
prices and incentives to innovate will drastically change.  See generally Chie Hoon Song 
& Jeung-Whan Han, Patent Cliff and Strategic Switch:  Exploring Strategic Design Possibilities 
in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 5 SPRINGERPLUS 692 (2016). 
 51. Erwin A Blackstone & Joseph P. Fuhr Jr., Biologics & Biosimilars:  The Possibility 
of Encouraging Innovation and Competition, SCITECH LAW., Spring 2015, at 4, 5–6; 
Huzair & Kale, supra note 38, at 252. 
 52. Affordable, BIOTECHNOLOGY INNOVATION ORG., http://innovationsaves.life/ 
affordable (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
 53. Gaudry, supra note 22, at 589.  “We predict that biosimilars will lead to a $44.2 
billion reduction in direct spending on biologic drugs from 2014 to 2024, or about 4 
percent of total biologic spending over the same period, with a range of $13 billion to $66 
billion.”  ANDREW W. MULCAHY ET AL., RAND CORP., THE COST SAVINGS POTENTIAL OF 
BIOSIMILAR DRUGS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2014), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/ 
rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE127/RAND_PE127.pdf. 
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Besides having similar molecular shape, efficacy, and safety to 
biologics,54 biosimilars will by nature provide lower cost-alternatives.  
Lower regulatory and financial barriers offer biologics manufacturers 
with more incentives to disclose manufacturing information in return 
for patent protection and exclusivity rights.  The biosimilar market 
discount versus the cost of originator biologics will be between twenty 
and forty percent for consumers, while historically the small-molecule 
generics market discount was around eighty percent in comparison to 
brand-name small-molecule pharmaceuticals.55  Because the market 
for oncology biologicals alone is over $100 billion, the innovation of 
originator biologics and biosimilars provide significant opportunity to 
pass savings on to consumers.56 
C. Inherent Scientific Development Differences Between Small-Molecule and 
Large-Molecule Pharmaceutical Compounds 
Research and development of biological therapies proliferated in 
response to inefficiencies in production and therapeutic precision 
within the small-molecule generics market.57  Generics make up over 
eighty percent of filled prescriptions in the United States, illustrating 
market saturation and a fast eroding market for small-molecule 
                                               
 54. Bennet et al., supra note 38, at 594. 
 55. Id. at 596; Hirsch & Lyman, supra note 36, at 264, 267; Steven D. Lucio et al., 
Biosimilars:  Implications for Health-System Pharmacists, 70 AM. J. HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACY 
2004, 2008, 2011–12 (2013). 
 56. Bennet et al., supra note 38, at 594; Price, Innovation Policy Failures, supra note 
8, at 344 (emphasizing that reducing excessive manufacturing costs could generate 
tens or hundreds of billions of dollars in consumer savings).  Manufacturing costs are 
either the first or second highest expense for sponsor drug firms.  Id.  “The 
successful integration and uptake of biosimilars in oncology may help to expand 
choices for clinicians and patients and increase accessibility to potentially beneficial 
treatments.”  Katherine H. Rak Tkaczuk & Ira Allen Jacobs, Biosimilars in Oncology:  
From Development to Clinical Practice, 41 SEMINARS ONCOLOGY 3, 11 (2014) (reporting 
that a study of 118 community-based oncologists found that nearly sixty percent now 
consider drug costs in clinical decision making, “roughly half reported the need to 
change treatment plans due to the loss of medical insurance, and 58% reported that 
patients refused treatment due to the financial concerns”). 
 57. See Dranitsaris et al., supra note 49, at 479 (describing the shift toward the 
development of biologics during the past two decades); Edward C. Li et al., 
Considerations in the Early Development of Biosimilar Products, DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY, 
May 2015, at 1 (noting that as the biologics market grows, changes in pharmaceutical 
product development will lead to more biosimilars as well). 
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drugs.58  In contrast to large molecule biosimilars, current regulation 
requires that small-molecule generics be the “bioequivalent” of its 
corresponding brand drug.59  A bioequivalence standard, requiring a 
well-controlled and “well-defined chemical structure and 
physiochemical properties,”60 illustrates the scientific community’s 
acceptance of easily classifying and replicating small-molecule 
reactions.  These manufacturing processes are relatively easy to 
replicate and set consistent standards for a quality product.61 
On the other hand, biologics have much larger molecular sizes and 
structures,62 consequently creating more uncertainty and difficulty in 
product standardization.63  Critical to safety and efficacy of 
biosimilars are studies of stability, pharmacokinetics, and 
                                               
 58. See Peter Wehrwein, A Conversation with Steve Miller, MD:  Come in and Talk with 
Us, Pharma, MANAGED CARE (Apr. 2015), http://www.managedcaremag.com/linkout 
/2015/4/27 (discussing how, by spurring innovation and lowering costs, pharmacy 
benefit managers, such as ExpressScripts, influence market saturation and consumer 
demand by acting as a medium that balances market disruption with savings, thereby 
analyzing data and sifting through the biopharmaceutical market to determine where 
consumer money is best spent); see also Simon King, The Best Selling Drugs of All Time; 
Humira Joins the Elite, FORBES (Jan. 28, 2013, 9:58 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
simonking/2013/01/28/the-best-selling-drugs-of-all-time-humira-joins-the-elite 
(illustrating biologic Humira’s ability to capture market share). 
 59. 21 C.F.R. § 320.33 (2016). 
 60. Preeta Kaur Chugh & Vandana Roy, Biosimilars:  Current Scientific and 
Regulatory Considerations, 9 CURRENT CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 53, 56 (2014). 
 61. Id. at 53; see also Thomas Reinke, Encouraging Guidance Released for Biosimilar 
Manufacturers, MANAGED CARE (Aug. 2014), http://www.managedcaremag.com/link 
out/2014/8/10 (stating that meeting well-defined bioequivalence or 
interchangeable status implies greater market acceptance). 
 62. Dranitsaris et al., supra note 49, at 479 (“[B]iological drugs are derived from 
living organisms or their products.  Biologicals are structurally more complex and 
unique from chemically synthesized [small-molecule drugs] because of their larger 
size and intricate manufacturing process.  Secondary to their protein structure, they 
are also more prone to acute and chronic immune responses.”).  Typically, 
biologicals are one hundred to one thousand times larger, “with amino acids joined 
to form complex primary, secondary, tertiary and quaternary structures, with post[-
]translational modifications.”  Chugh & Roy, supra note 60, at 56. 
 63. Chugh & Roy, supra note 60, at 53, 56; Price, Regulating Secrecy, supra, note 33, 
at 1793 (“[T]he secretive, idiosyncratic, and frequently stochastic way biologics are 
made hampers the development of biosimilars.”); see Blackstone & Fuhr, supra note 
51, at 5 (discussing the complexity of manufacturing biologics and the small margin 
for error); see also Price, Innovation Policy Failures, supra note 8, at 345 (noting that 
biologicals manufacturing typically faces higher absolute costs than other drugs on 
both a fixed and per-unit bases). 
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pharmacological mechanisms.64  The manufacturing processes of 
biosimilars create variability in structure and therefore cause 
variability in immunological responses.65 
Variability and these barriers to entry, however, are opportunities 
for manufacturers to reach captive markets, which is exemplified by 
the patent-trade secret trade-off scenario.  There, the manufacturer 
can either withhold information as trade secrets to prevent follow-on 
manufacturers from reverse-engineering biologics or processes, or 
the manufacturer can disclose critical aspects of the process in return 
for patent exclusivity periods.66  Ultimately, the manufacturer wants 
the patent and BLA/aBLA claims to be broad enough to protect 
subsequent innovation, while narrow enough to prevent subsequent 
biopharmaceutical manufacturers from reverse-engineering and 
pushing the biologic originator out of the market.67 
D. Manufacturing Innovation:  The Rate-Determining Step for Biologics 
and Biosimilars Market Growth 
Innovation requires sharing information among pioneers.  In the 
highly regulated drug industry, manufacturers are incentivized to 
innovate when provided with reasonable investment-backed 
expectations and compensation in return for information disclosure.  
When biologics and biosimilars manufacturers are provided time and 
incentive to analyze manufacturing “drift,”68 there will be more 
efficient manufacturing methods, alternative therapeutic uses, and 
innovative manufacturing processes, all of which will improve drug 
safety, efficacy, and purity.69 
                                               
 64. Shein-Chung Chow et al., Scientific Considerations for Assessing Biosimilar 
Products, 32 STAT. MED. 370, 371–72 (2013); see also Lucio et al., supra note 55, at 
2010; Ross & Richard, supra note 38, at 297. 
 65. Chow et al., supra note 64, at 375–76; Chugh & Roy, supra note 60, at 56 
(describing how differences in manufacturing can involve structural changes in 
extraction, purification processes, three-dimensional environmental structure, 
quantity of acid-base variants, and the glycosylation profile); see also Roe, supra note 4, 
at S28 (reporting that immunogenicity and immune responses caused by these 
structural changes during the manufacturing process are the primary safety concerns 
of biosimilars prescribers). 
 66. See infra Part III. 
 67. Blackstone & Fuhr, supra note 51, at 7; see infra Section II.A. 
 68. Tkaczuk & Jacobs, supra note 56, at 5–6 (defining “drift” as the 
physiochemical variance of biologics characteristics over time). 
 69. McCamish & Woollett, supra note 4, at 407–08 (explaining that sponsors 
routinely change manufacturing processes when scaling, improving efficacy, or 
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The development and acceptance of biologics and biosimilars for 
cancer therapies accentuates how precision medicines depend upon 
a manufacturer’s incentive to innovate.70  As biologics develop, 
cancer treatments will be tailored to each patient and target specific 
characteristics of the tumor or tumor-causing agent, illustrating the 
accurate and precise nature of biological therapies.71 
Similarly, yet not ideally, biosimilars manufacturers first determine 
and then compare quality target product profile (QTPP) parameters 
to coincide with the RPS’s process.72  Biosimilar manufacturers 
possess and use process “knowledge of cell expansion, filtration, 
centrifugation, purification, product characterization, and . . . 
product stability” to meet the FDA’s minimum safety and efficacy 
standards.73  The strength of their process knowledge and 
reassurance of quality, safety, and efficacy is then translated to 
clinicians and physicians to ensure they are informed decision 
makers before consulting with patients.74  Thus, the FDA can 
indirectly control which biopharmaceuticals—and therefore the 
extent of clinical trial data necessary—physicians and other health-
care providers prescribe and integrate into clinical practice.75  
                                               
modernizing the process, thus providing an avenue to explore manufacturing 
innovation). 
 70. Roe, supra note 4, at 28–29 (“[I]ncreased use of biosimilars may be seen as a 
possible cost saving in the treatment of cancer, offering greater access to treatments 
and providing the option for treatments to be introduced earlier.”); Wehrwein, supra 
note 58 (concluding that more and more drug products overlap in indication, 
including biosimilars, which will offer cheaper alternatives and quality care); see also 
Lucio et al., supra note 55, at 2006 (describing the complexities of manufacturing 
processes including isolating a targeted gene, cloning and then expressing the 
gene).  Compare supra Section I.C (acknowledging that incentivizing biologics 
variability assessments is dependent upon the target market), with Chugh & Roy, 
supra note 60, at 56 (“Biologics with complex production processes and the resultant 
heterogeneous compounds make it difficult to standardise the product, 
manufacture, and ensure adequate activity, integrity, and quality.”).  Idealistically, 
biologics could become a single-treatment cure, whereby clinicians tell 
manufacturers the exact indication or treatment required, and the manufacturer 
adjusts process parameters to output the desired formulary. 
 71. Tkaczuk & Jacobs, supra note 56, at 3.  For example, Trastuzumab, a biologic, is 
the first targeted therapy for women with HER2 overexpressed breast cancer.  Id. at 3–4. 
 72. Bui et al., supra note 34, at 7. 
 73. Lucio et al., supra note 55, at 2006, 2009. 
 74. Tkaczuk & Jacobs, supra note 56, at 6. 
 75. Id. at 10; see David M. Dudzinski, Reflections on Historical, Scientific, and Legal 
Issues Relevant to Designing Approval Pathways for Generic Versions of Recombinant Protein-
Based Therapeutics and Monoclonal Antibodies, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 143, 143–45 (2005) 
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Customers and clinicians know a biologic typically costs at least 
twenty times more than a small-molecule drug.76  What they don’t 
know is how the market will respond to biologics—i.e., whether the 
market will find them worth the cost—though clinical data should 
point consumers in the right direction. 
Biosimilars require analytical comparability,77 which must 
demonstrate that the biosimilar is “highly similar” without having 
“clinically meaningful differences . . . in terms of the safety, purity, 
and potency.”78  These statutory and FDA mandates result in 
consumers and physicians receiving the critical data necessary for 
acceptance and prescription of these medicines.  The FDA must 
therefore balance safety requirements and economic rationale for 
drug development79 to ensure biosimilar manufacturers continue to 
explore optimal process parameter designs.80  Enhanced safety and 
comparability studies allow physicians to make informed policy 
decisions about the administration of these new therapies;81 they also 
require that the manufacturing process achieve a formulation 
                                               
(discussing the history of biologics and recommending a regulatory framework for the 
FDA to adopt regarding biologics under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act). 
 76. Ude Lu, Note, Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act:  Striking a Delicate 
Balance Between Innovation and Accessibility, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 613, 633 (2014). 
 77. See Berlex Labs., Inc. v. FDA, 942 F. Supp. 19, 25–27 (D.D.C. 1996) 
(upholding the FDA’s authority to use the comparability process, requiring 
pharmacological and therapeutic equivalence). 
 78. 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(2)(A)–(B) (2012); see also Chow et al., supra note 64, at 374. 
 79. Hirsch & Lyman, supra note 36, at 265; see also W. Nicholson Price II & I. Glenn 
Cohen, Nudging the FDA, AM. INT., Nov./Dec. 2014, at 35, 36 (highlighting the role of 
the FDA “in balancing the safety of drugs against their potential” treatment use). 
 80. These design parameters are “goalposts” that a biologicals license candidate 
uses to compare to the reference originator product.  McCamish & Woollett, supra 
note 4, at 410.  Any parameter for the biosimilar outside of the goalpost must be 
shown to have no clinically significant impact on the final product.  Id. 
 81. Chugh & Roy, supra note 60, at 62 (“Evidence-based medicine and clinical 
experience strongly influence a physician’s decision to prescribe a particular product.  
Physician’s acceptance and subsequent prescribing of a new biosimilar product will 
require adequate information and evidence ensuring efficacy and patient safety.”); 
Lucio et al., supra note 55, at 2007 (noting that because bioequivalence cannot be 
established, health institutions and physicians will need to individually evaluate 
biosimilars before prescribing them); see also Tkaczuk & Jacobs, supra note 56, at 5 
(stating that scientific societies must help evaluate biosimilar data while educating 
healthcare providers and providing general consensus regarding effective therapeutic 
uses); Roe, supra note 4, at 29 (maintaining that physicians act as advocates for patients 
and will further support biosimilars in a clinical setting once biosimilar drug 
mechanisms and differences in the side effect profiles are understood). 
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containing the least amount of other chemicals.82  Ultimately, a 
manufacturer’s goals must include a more quantitative, mechanism-
based understanding, and an ability to predict human health, disease, 
and intervention responses.83 
However, scientific and legal restraints force manufacturers to 
essentially construct manufacturing processes from scratch.84  
Accordingly, there is significant risk with uncertain and 
unquantifiable reward because the biosimilar manufacturing process 
may fail to identically replicate an originator biologic, or it may 
ideally produce enhanced process control and new therapeutic 
uses.85  Nevertheless, rather than precise structure and 
physiochemical characterization, biosimilarity subsequently turns into 
a comparative analysis:  assessing manufacturing process variability 
and comparing product efficacy and safety between an innovator and 
FOB by using QTPP parameters.86 
II. FDA EXCLUSIVITY:  TAKING ADVANTAGE OF AN EXECUTIVE 
AGENCY’S SUPPLY OF DE FACTO MONOPOLIES 
The BPCIA’s dual mission of promoting innovation and 
accessibility of biologics creates unique opportunities for biologics 
manufacturers.  To promote innovation, the FDA grants market and 
data exclusivity periods.  Specifically, the twelve-year market and four-
year data exclusivity periods for originator biologics prevent 
biosimilars or interchangeables from being approved.87  One of the 
most effective opportunities innovators utilize is the FDA data 
exclusivity grant.  While market exclusivity means “simply having no 
competition for a product in the marketplace,” data exclusivity refers 
to protection of the drug and original clinical trial data, preventing 
manufacturers from supporting approval of their biosimilar.88  Only a 
                                               
 82. Dudzinski, supra note 75, at 232. 
 83. Woodcock, supra note 13, at 152; see infra Section IV.C.2 (arguing that, 
because they possess first-hand process knowledge, originators are best capable of 
analyzing and predicting societal health improvements from current and enhanced 
manufacturing capabilities). 
 84. Price, Innovation Policy Failures, supra note 8, at 350. 
 85. Blackstone & Fuhr, supra note 51, at 5. 
 86. Chow et al., supra note 64, at 380. 
 87. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A)–(B) (2012); Lu, supra note 76, at 613–14. 
 88. Jonathan Stroud, Comment, The Illusion of Interchangeability:  The Benefits and 
Dangers of Guidance-Plus Rulemaking in the FDA’s Biosimilar Approval Process, 63 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 599, 602 nn.13–14 (2011). 
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biologic with a structural modification resulting in a change in safety, 
purity, or potency is eligible for data exclusivity.89  But once the four-
year data exclusivity grant elapses, the FDA starts accepting aBLAs.90  
These applicants piggy-back off of the approved originator’s clinical 
trials in anticipation of the market exclusivity term expiration.91 
FDA exclusivity grants provide unique and potentially stronger 
protection than patent exclusivity for four reasons:  (1) novel 
biologic’s composition classifications inherently cover a larger scope 
than a single patent; (2) currently, twelve years of exclusivity likely 
meets or slightly surpasses the life of the biologic’s active composition 
patent;92 (3) FDA exclusivity is independent from, and in addition to, 
claims for patent exclusivity; and (4) FDA exclusivity inherently 
inhibits reverse-engineering and designing-around.93  The advantages 
of these FDA exclusivity grants in light of their disclosure 
requirements are examined below with respect to originator biologics 
and FOB manufacturing processes. 
A. Obligations for Biological Products Market Entry 
Before a manufacturer may introduce a biological product into 
interstate commerce, it must receive a biologics license authorized 
under the Public Health Service Act (“PHSA”).94  Before 2010, the FDA 
granted biologics licenses only under section 351(a) of the PHSA for 
pioneers (i.e. innovators) and for select products and hormones under 
section 505(b)(2) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).95 
In 2010, the BPCIA implemented a balance between societal health 
implications and incentivizing market growth through both increased 
                                               
 89. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(I)(cc) (2012). 
 90. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY:  
REFERENCE PRODUCT EXCLUSIVITY FOR BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS FILED UNDER SECTION 
351(A) OF THE PHS ACT 1 (Aug. 2014), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guida 
ncecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm407844.pdf. 
 91. Id. at 2–3. 
 92. As prior art and manufacturing methodology improves, process innovations 
are likely to require less testing and validation; thus, patents can be applied for 
earlier in the biologics development life-cycle, and exclusivities are thereby likely to 
extend past patent protection. 
 93. Lu, supra note 76, at 623–24. 
 94. Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201–300; Richard A. Epstein, The 
Constitutional Protection of Trade Secrets and Patents Under the Biologics Price Competition 
and Innovation Act of 2009, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 285, 285 (2011). 
 95. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–99; Epstein, supra note 94, at 
285, 294; see supra note 39. 
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consumer access and incentivized innovation.  The BPCIA revised 
section 351(a) to create a stand-alone pathway for abbreviated 
applications under section 351(k) of the PHSA.96  With the change, 
the FOB applicant must show that “the biological product . . . is safe, 
pure, and potent.”97  However, the safety, purity, and potency is 
controlled directly by the biological product’s manufacturing process.  
Thus, “the facility in which the biological product is manufactured, 
processed, packed, or held [must meet] standards designed to assure 
that the biological product continues to be safe, pure, and potent.”98 
The BPCIA (1) established standards for application and 
approval,99 (2) provided a term of data exclusivity,100 and (3) 
established a scheme for handling patent disputes.101  However, the 
BPCIA imposes a new disclosure requirement for license holders and 
imposes requirements on both pioneer biologic and biosimilar 
manufacturers:102  for instance, it requires pioneer biologic 
manufacturers to provide applicants with a list of patents it believes 
“could reasonably be asserted” as infringed with respect to the 
pioneer product.103  The BPCIA requires this exchange to be in good 
                                               
 96. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k); Epstein, supra note 94, at 286.  The BPCIA stipulates that 
a manufacture may not apply for a biosimilars license until four years after—and the 
biosimilar cannot be approved until twelve years after—the reference biologic is 
approved.  Strand & Cronstein, supra note 36, at 220. 
 97. 42 U.S.C. § 262(a)(2)(C)(i)(I). 
 98. § 262(a)(2)(C)(i)(II). 
 99. Tkaczuk & Jacobs, supra note 56, at 5 (arguing that the goal of biosimilar 
development should be to show sufficient similarity in composition, biological 
activity, and pharmacokinetics to allow existing efficacy and safety data to be used, 
thus resulting in a more efficient development and approval process). 
 100. McCamish & Woollett, supra note 4, at 408 (highlighting the twelve year 
period of exclusivity for innovator biologics provided by the BPCIA). 
 101. § 262(l)(1)(F). 
 102. Chugh & Roy, supra note 60, at 60–61 (noting that the aBLA for highly 
similar biological products requires a demonstration of the same “mechanism of 
action, route of administration, dosage form, and potency” compared to the 
innovator product); Tucker & Wells, supra note 39, at 101 (listing the steps at which a 
pioneer must share information with a follow-on manufacturer, including:  follow-on 
application disclosure, first pioneer response, follow-on response, second pioneer 
response, negotiations and initial litigations, and notice of commercial marketing). 
 103. § 262(l)(3)(A)(i) (requiring the RPS, no later than sixty days after receiving 
applicants information, to provide “a list of patents for which the reference product 
sponsor believes a claim of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted by the 
reference product sponsor”); see also § 262(l)(3)(B) (providing that the applicant 
may proactively provide the RPS with “a list of patents to which the subsection (k) 
applicant believes a claim of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted” but 
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faith so that the applicant and RPS agree on which patents will be the 
subject of any infringement action.104  This is a critical step in process 
protection for the manufacturer:  it must decide whether trade 
secrecy or patentability provides the best value for protection.105  
Because confidential manufacturing information would be provided 
by the applicant to the RPS,106 both the RPS and the FOB applicant 
must determine the value of their manufacturing processes (and 
clinical trials) prior to any exclusivity grant expiration.  Additional 
considerations relevant to the approval process for biologics and FOB 
include “the timing of application submission and the duration of 
market exclusivity for originator reference products”;107 furthermore, 
the BPCIA does not operate retroactively with respect to any data 
submitted prior to its enactment.108 
                                               
must provide a statement regarding why the applicant believes the patent is invalid, 
unenforceable, or will not be infringed by the biological). 
Patents provide a piece-meal description, like pieces of a puzzle, toward a 
determination of infringement.  Only the potential infringer knows what the whole 
puzzle looks like, and the challenging party must analyze each piece to determine 
whether it fits within this puzzle or whether it is part of a puzzle of its own.  
Essentially, real-time analysis of the process is required for this determination, 
exemplified by the fact that science currently cannot classify, with sufficient 
particularity, all attributes and structures of a biologic.  See Robin Feldman & W. 
Nicholson Price II, Patent Trolling:  Why Bio and Pharmaceuticals Are at Risk, 17 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 773, 803 (2014) (discussing the difficulty in assessing patent 
infringement because of the propensity for trade secrecy).  But see W. Nicholson 
Price II, Making Do in Making Drugs:  Innovation Policy and Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturing, 55 B.C. L. REV. 491, 526–27, 555 (2014) [hereinafter Price, Making Do 
in Making Drugs] (describing the statutory rebuttable presumption of infringement 
in favor of the patent holder, if the plaintiff shows “(1) that a substantial likelihood 
exists that the product was made by the patented process, and (2) that the plaintiff 
made a reasonable effort to determine the process actually used in the production of 
the product and was unable to so determine” (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 295)).  
Furthermore, 35 U.S.C. § 271 provides a safe harbor of sorts, stating indirectly that 
there is no patent infringement for using a product from a patented manufacturing 
process for the development of a related biologic, which enables the generic to be 
placed on the market as soon as the patent expires.  35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). 
 104. Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
§ 7002(a)(2), 124 Stat. 119, 804–21 (2010).  However, if there is no agreement between 
parties as to which patents shall be the subject of an infringement action, the RPS may 
not exceed the number of patents listed by the applicant.  42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(5). 
 105. See infra Section III.B. 
 106. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(l)–(2); see infra text accompanying note 122. 
 107. Lucio et al., supra note 55, at 2008. 
 108. Epstein, supra note 94, at 304. 
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Exclusivity periods balance the interests of the patent holder with 
societal access and health implications.  They provide valuable time for 
the patent holder to assess a biopharmaceutical’s price necessary for 
recovering its initial investment.109  Indirectly, they accelerate the 
competition’s entry into the biological market110—with procedures by 
which manufacturers can formally resolve patent negotiations111—and 
provide time for the RPS to identify areas of improvement for potential 
patent extensions.112  During the data exclusivity period, the FDA 
cannot approve a similar or identical drug formulation that relies on 
the RPS’s data.113  However, the data exclusivity period does not 
preclude FOB sponsors from conducting independent research and 
clinical trials.  Effectively similar to the exclusionary right in patent law, 
data exclusivity blocks competition and creates artificial scarcity.114 
Lastly, the RPS may be eligible for an additional subsequent data 
exclusivity period if an existing product is altered such that it 
becomes “new” and has the ability to improve disease treatment.115  
Three primary authors of the BPCIA encouraged a liberal stance 
regarding what constitutes a “new” product, and if that position is 
adopted, structural changes would be considered “new” and 
therefore rewarded exclusivity periods in the future.116 
B. Regulatory Threshold Standards for Approval of a Follow-on Biologics 
Generic products, and specifically biosimilars, can substantially 
reduce the costs for patients and taxpayers.117  These cost reductions 
primarily stem from piggy-backing upon RPS’s clinical trials and data.  
Using current analytical techniques, biosimilar manufacturers must 
compare the safety and efficacy impact of the innovator product to 
the reference biological product, instead of assessing how process 
                                               
 109. Id. at 286; see also Price & Cohen, supra, note 79, at 35 (“[The FDA] also 
controls the accelerator and brake pedals on drug development and innovation 
through its control of market exclusivity for approved new drugs.”). 
 110. Epstein, supra note 94, at 286. 
 111. Lucio et al., supra note 55, at 2008. 
 112. See Blackstone & Fuhr, supra note 51, at 6; Bui et al., supra note 34, at 8–9. 
 113. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A); see Gaudry, supra note 22, at 592. 
 114. Sorscher, supra note 17, at 294. 
 115. Gaudry, supra note 22, at 594. 
 116. Letter from Rep. Anna G. Eshoo, Rep. Jay Inslee, and Rep. Joe Barton to 
Food and Drug Administration (Dec. 21, 2010), http://www.hpm.com/pdf/EIB%20 
Ltr%20FDA%20DEC%202010.pdf. 
 117. See Stroud, supra note 88, at 605. 
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changes correlate to the final product.118  FOB applicants must 
demonstrate four criteria:  (1) FOB and reference biologic product 
are biosimilar; (2) FOB and reference biologic product employ the 
same mechanism of action for the applicable condition; (3) FOB and 
reference biologic product share the same conditions of use, route of 
administration, dosage form, and strength; and (4) the facility in 
which the FOB is manufactured, processed, packed, or held meets 
safety, purity, and potency standards.119  If sameness is proven, 
additional clinical trials for safety would not be needed; additionally, 
historical human use provides evidence of safety.120 
Follow-on biologics capitalize on the abbreviated approval pathway 
for both biosimilars and interchangeable biological products.121  
Originator biological product applicants must show “the FDA that its 
process reliably produces a pure and therapeutically effective 
biologic; to the extent that the process defines the product, [it] must 
fully lay out its process to assist the FDA to understand the product 
seeking approval.”122  Biosimilars require a demonstration of 
comparability while small-molecule generics require a demonstration 
of bioequivalence.123  Biocomparability or biosimilarity is derived 
                                               
 118. Price, Regulating Secrecy, supra note 33, at 1796.  Comparative analytical 
characterization may lead to one of four assessments within the development-phase 
continuum:  (1) not similar, illustrating differences in results of analytical 
characterization leading to further development through 351(k) not being 
recommended; (2) similar, illustrating further information needed to determine 
whether differences are within acceptable range to consider proposed biosimilar 
product to be highly similar; (3) highly similar, illustrating proposed biosimilar 
meets the statutory standard for analytical similarity, with residual uncertainty 
capable of being resolved with targeted and selective animal and/or clinical studies; 
and (4) highly similar with fingerprint-like similarity, illustrating the proposed 
biosimilar meets statutory standards for analytical similarity based on a high level of 
confidence and analytical similarity, with residual uncertainty capable of being 
resolved with targeted and selective animal and/or clinical studies.  U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY DATA TO SUPPORT A 
DEMONSTRATION OF BIOSIMILARITY TO A REFERENCE PRODUCT 5–6 (Dec. 2016), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/
guidances/ucm397017.pdf. 
 119. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i) (2012); see also Gaudry, supra note 22, at 596 
(describing the requirements for FOB applications). 
 120. § 262(k)(4). 
 121. § 262(i)(2)(B), (k)(2). 
 122. Price, Regulating Secrecy, supra note 33, at 1803. 
 123. Li et al., supra note 57, at 3; see McCamish & Woollett, supra note 4, at 409 
(correlating attributes of the product to safety, purity, and potency for the United 
States, and quality, safety, and efficacy for Europe).  Thus, the development of 
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from analytical studies (establishing similarity), as well as animal 
studies (assessing toxicity) and clinical studies (assessing 
immunogenicity and pharmacokinetics or pharmacodynamics) to 
determine if a biologic is safe and effective.124 
Interchangeable biologics on the other hand, require more 
extensive showings but provide additional incentives.  
Interchangeable biologics (1) must meet the standards for 
biosimilarity, (2) should “produce the same clinical result as the 
reference product in any given patient,” and (3) can be switched 
between the FOB and originator without presenting any ancillary 
safety or efficacy risks.125  If the FOB is deemed interchangeable with 
the reference product, a pharmacist may automatically substitute or 
propose substitution without intervention from the prescribing 
health-care provider.126  Important to prescribing physicians and 
pharmacists is that there are no additional safety or efficacy risks 
when switching between the original and interchangeable biological 
product; however, these risk examinations require additional 
studies—with, at best, potential exclusivity advantages.127  Due to the 
current scientific state of biologics design and manufacturing,128 the 
FDA has not approved any interchangeable biologics product, and 
applicants are more likely to seek biosimilar approval prior to seeking 
                                               
biosimilars requires iterative manufacturing process developments using elements of 
quality by design to produce the QTPP of the reference biologic.  Bui et al., supra 
note 34, at 9. 
 124. Gaudry, supra note 22, at 598. 
 125. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(4)(A)(ii); see also § 262(i)(2)(B), (i)(3); Ross & Richard, 
supra note 38, at 296; Tucker & Wells, supra note 39, at 100.  “Interchangeability is 
important because it provides for a period of market exclusivity as well as for 
automatic substitution of the interchangeable for the approved biologic without 
intervention from the prescribing physician.”  Patricia Fitzpatrick Dimond, FDA 
Releases Biosimilars Guidelines to Little Fanfare, GENETIC ENGINEERING & BIOTECHNOLOGY 
NEWS (Mar. 15, 2102), http://www.genengnews.com/gen-articles/fda-releases-
biosimilars-guidelines-to-little-fanfare/4035.  However, the FDA has acknowledged that 
it is scientifically difficult to currently meet interchangeable data requirements.  Id. 
 126. 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(3). 
 127. The standards for interchangeability are higher than biosimilarity because an 
interchangeable biologic can be substituted with the reference product without 
acknowledgement by a healthcare provider.  Tkaczuk & Jacobs, supra note 56, at 7; 
Reinke, supra note 61. 
 128. Price & Rai, supra note 42, at 188 (“[F]undamental knowledge has not 
advanced to the point where product characteristics can fully be identified and 
characterized through analysis of the final product.”). 
ELEVI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/2017  6:37 PM 
938 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:911 
approval for an interchangeable biological product.129  The Federal 
Trade Commission estimates that development of an FOB would take 
between eight and ten years and cost $100 to $200 million; and, 
because these FOBs will primarily be biosimilars, sponsors will miss 
out on first interchangeable FOB exclusivity periods.130 
With the enactment of the BPCIA, originator and innovator 
biologics manufacturers are incentivized to invest in long-term 
biological manufacturing process improvements.131  “[B]iosimilars . . . 
can make the same headroom that generics made in the past”132 
without the patent cliff fear that plagued the generics market, 
providing an additional incentive to enter the biosimilars market.  
The FOB applicant can submit its aBLA four years after the reference 
                                               
 129. McCamish & Woollett, supra note 4, at 411 (“Although an initial application 
in the United States for a biosimilar can be for an interchangeable product, it is 
expected that most sponsors will seek to establish biosimilarity first and then 
supplement their dossier with additional data to support interchangeability.”); 
Tkaczuk & Jacobs, supra note 56, at 8 (“Interchangeability therefore requires an 
expectation that the safety and efficacy risk is not greater than the reference product 
not only in the population but at the individual patient level, and this is, necessarily, 
a very high standard that may be difficult to establish on a scientific basis.”); see also 
Stroud, supra note 88, at 626 (noting that higher interchangeability standards may 
mean the costs do not outweigh the benefits of generic status). 
 130. FED. TRADE COMM’N, EMERGING HEALTH CARE ISSUES:  FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC 
DRUG COMPETITION iii, 10 (2009), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/06/P083901biologics 
report.pdf; see also 42 U.S.C. § 262.  Currently, investments pursuing interchangeability 
are not fiscally justified due to the scientific state of biologics comparability, and the 
uncertainty of physician—as well as consumer—acceptance of biologics. 
 131. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS 
IN DEMONSTRATING BIOSIMILARITY TO A REFERENCE PRODUCT 7 (Apr. 2015) [hereinafter 
HHS, SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS], http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Guidanc 
eComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM291128.pdf (encouraging 
biosimilar sponsors to use a “stepwise approach” in developing and testing a 
biosimilar); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., QUALITY CONSIDERATIONS 
IN DEMONSTRATING BIOSIMILARITY OF A THERAPEUTIC PROTEIN PRODUCT TO A REFERENCE 
PRODUCT 10–16 (Apr. 2015) [hereinafter HHS, QUALITY CONSIDERATIONS], 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation
/Guidances/UCM291134.pdf (discussing factors sponsors should consider during 
the development and testing of a biosimilar); Chugh & Roy, supra note 60, at 62 
(concluding that biologics’ complexity requires “ongoing risk-benefit assessment and 
effective post-marketing pharmacovigilance to ensure product safety and efficacy”); 
Huzair & Kale, supra note 38, at 251. 
 132. Wehrwein, supra note 58.  The biosimilar class is a much more attractive 
investment, so headroom must be made in the form of long-term value as opposed to 
short-term price differential.  See Biobetters Versus Biosimilars, supra note 4 (comparing 
the twenty-five percent to the seventy-to-ninety percent price erosion of biosimilars 
versus small molecule generics). 
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biological product is licensed.133  Thus, the FOB has ample time—
eight years after the expiration of the four-year data exclusivity 
period—to obtain product approval prior to the expiration of the 
RPS’s market exclusivity period. 
FOB applicants have been hesitant to use the biosimilars application 
process, as they continue to encounter significant risks and barriers to 
entry.  The aBLA for “highly similar” biological products follows the 
pathway outlined by section 351(k) of PHSA.134  Examiners use a 
“totality-of-the-evidence” approach to evaluate the biologics 
application.135  However, these requirements do not sufficiently assist 
physician decision-making processes, prompting applicants to push-
back.136  Notably, the first aBLA was not approved until 2015.137 
The design of the clinical trial is the most important aspect for 
approval of the aBLA138 and uses a step-wise approach139 for assessing 
trial progress.140  Conducting clinical trials amount to about half of 
drug approval costs.141  The step-wise approach also allows investors to 
make critical investment decisions along the way to assess and add 
value to the biosimilarity determination.142  However, a sentiment 
                                               
 133. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(B). 
 134. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(k); HHS, QUALITY CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 131, at 1; 
HHS, SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 131, at 9. 
 135. Chow et al., supra note 64, at 362; Lucio et al., supra note 55, at 2009. 
 136. For examples of the lack of confidence in gaining product approval and in 
the requirements for approval, see Anna Rose Welch, Are Emerging U.S. Biosimilar 
Policies at Risk of Alienating Physicians?, BIOSIMILAR DEV. (Apr. 5, 2016), 
http://www.biosimilardevelopment.com/doc/are-emerging-u-s-biosimilar-policies-at-
risk-of-alienating-physicians-0001; Anna Rose Welch, How to Approach U.S. Physicians 
About Biosimilars, BIOSIMILAR DEV. (Nov. 21, 2016), 
http://www.biosimilardevelopment.com/doc/how-to-approach-u-s-physicians-about-
biosimilars-0001. 
 137. Janet Woodcock, Biosimilar Implementation:  A Progress Report from FDA, FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN. (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Testimony/ucm463036.htm. 
 138. McCamish & Woollett, supra note 4, at 412 (discussing that the sponsor of a 
biosimilar must have a thorough understanding of how to characterize the originator 
product so suitable tests are used and the clinical trials are designed effectively). 
 139. Li et al., supra note 57, at 3 (intending biosimilarity analysis to be product-
specific, “with each step serving to resolve as much remaining uncertainty as possible”). 
 140. “Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) remain the gold standard for assessing 
the efficacy and safety of new drugs.”  Dranitsaris et al., supra note 49, at 481; see also 
Strand & Cronstein, supra note 36, at 220 (indicating that the FDA uses a stepwise, 
risk-based approach to determine the extent of residual uncertainty that should be 
addressed by more animal and clinical studies). 
 141. Sorscher, supra note 17, at 293–94. 
 142. Li et al., supra note 57, at 7. 
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many applicants likely agree with, is that the FDA must expand the 
role of clinical pharmacology studies.143  In other words, the burden 
on the FOB applicant remains too high, and the FDA should 
consider data directly impacting patients as opposed to theoretical 
pharmacokinetics and pharmacodynamics studies.144 
After a “patent dance,”145 the approval process concludes with the 
originator’s reference biological product scope and the innovator’s 
FOB application.146  During the dance, the applicant clearly has the 
higher degree of risk:  the data exclusivity period has elapsed and the 
market exclusivity period of the RPS has already been granted.  Pfizer 
Inc. v. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, Ltd.147 illustrates that the generic drug 
manufacturer “must walk a fine line” by achieving similarity but 
avoiding patent infringement.148  Thus, the applicant must make a risky 
                                               
 143. The FDA has broad discretion inherently built into a “highly similar” 
determination that could allow it to give more weight to these studies.  See Stroud, 
supra note 88, at 625 (providing an example of how permissive the FDA may be:  
“[t]he FDA can waive toxicity or certain Phase II and Phase III trials upon a ‘good 
enough’ showing of chemical similarity”). 
 144. Reinke, supra note 61. 
 145. The patent dance is a procedure, after the biosimilar application has been 
submitted to the FDA, where the applicant and RPS resolve patent disputes.  Louis E. 
Fogel & Peter H. Hanna, The Biosimilar Regulatory Pathway and the Patent Dance, JENNER 
& BLOCK (Dec. 2014) https://jenner.com/system/assets/publications/13837/origin 
al/The_Biosimilar_Regulatory_Pathway_and_the_Patent_Dance.pdf (noting that the 
patent dance involves strictly timed and sequential rounds of exchanging 
information); see also Jeff Overley, Biosimilar Notice Always Mandatory, Fed. Circ. Rules, 
LAW360 (July 5, 2016, 1:05 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/792580/biosimilar 
-notice-always-mandatory-fed-circ-rules (explaining that the exchanging of 
intellectual property information is meant to streamline patent litigation).  The 
Federal Circuit ruled that a 180-day notice provision in the BPCIA is required even if 
the biosimilar makers participate in the patent dance.  Id.  Because the 180 days’ 
notice is required following FDA approval, reference product sponsors are provided 
time to prepare a motion for preliminary injunction and have it decided prior to the 
biosimilar’s product launch.  Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052, 1066 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016), cert. denied, No. 16-332, 2016 WL 4944497 (U.S. Dec. 12, 2016); Robert E. 
Colletti & Daniel G. Worley, Sandoz Requests U.S. Supreme Court Interpretation of the 
Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act in Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., FROMMER 
LAWRENCE & HAUG LLP (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.flhlaw.com/insights/Detail.aspx 
?news=31436f18-c433-4829-abee-cbc28b937129&. 
 146. In Sandoz v. Amgen, a biosimilar maker could not file a patent suit unless and 
until the parties had danced the Patent Dance (a strict jurisdictional bar).  773 F.3d 
1274, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 147. 359 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 148. Dudzinski, supra note 75, at 210.  Norvasc attempted to rely on Pfizer’s data 
to support FDA approval of its aNDA by arguing that an intermediate ingredient 
 
ELEVI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/2017  6:37 PM 
2017] INCENTIVIZING BIOLOGICS INNOVATION 941 
decision by determining what manufacturing process information to 
patent and disclose and what information to conceal as a trade 
secret.149  This determination must be made on a case-by-case basis 
when analyzing exactly what the RPS has claimed and how the 
innovator can subsequently penetrate the biopharmaceutical market. 
III. PATENT EXCLUSIVITY:  BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS AND THE RIGHT TO 
EXCLUDE 
Patent breadth and licensing opportunities help applicants navigate 
the patent-trade secret scenario.  If a patent is too broad, it may 
accidentally or strategically cover claims an originator may not have 
developed but were ripe for licensing.150  The interplay between 
granted patents and applicant claims is exemplified in the blocking 
patent scenario:  two patents block each other when one patentee has 
a broad patent on an invention and another has a narrower patent on 
some improved feature of that invention.  The broad patent dominates 
the narrower one.  In such a situation, the holder of the narrower 
patent needs a license from the dominant patent holder to practice the 
improved invention.151  The particular improved feature claimed in the 
narrower patent, however, cannot be practiced by the dominant patent 
holder without a license from the narrower patent holder.152 
An invention or innovation is eligible for patenting after the 
inventor produces a description that enables one skilled in the art to 
practice the invention.153  Patents provide their own twenty-year 
exclusivity periods.154  But, with respect to biologics manufacturing 
                                               
(amlodipine maleate) fell outside the scope of Pfizer’s patent.  Pfizer, 359 F.3d at 1365, 
1367 (holding that the extended period of a patent covers not only the active ingredient 
in an approved drug but also intermediary ingredients that are critical to the process). 
 149. See infra Part IV. 
 150. However, this may raise enablement issues.  See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012) (“The 
specification shall contain a written description . . . in such full, clear, concise, and exact 
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art . . . to make and use . . . the invention.”). 
 151. Merges & Nelson, supra note 7, at 860–61. 
 152. Id.  An owner of a patent with composition claims can assert the patent against an 
inventor who makes the molecule by another process, even if the follow-on process is 
much more efficient.  Feldman & Price, supra note 103, at 791–92 (explaining that 
inventing around a blocked technology in the biopharma industry requires high costs 
due to the strength of the patents established by FDA’s regulatory apparatus). 
 153. 35 U.S.C. § 112. 
 154. § 154(a)(2).  The twenty-year patent term begins when the patent application 
is filed.  Id.  The average length of time required post-patent and pre-aBLA is 
typically seven-and-a-half to eight years.  Sorscher, supra note 17, at 295.  As science 
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processes, strong patent protection is not always available.  Therefore, 
the exclusivity period must provide the manufacturer with sufficient 
incentive to disclose valuable biologics process information.  Because 
one patent can produce upwards of ninety percent of a 
manufacturer’s revenue, manufacturers must decide exactly what 
information to disclose and how to claim their process while ensuring 
they reap all benefits from a robust patent and subsequent monopoly. 
A patent prevents others from making, using, offering to sell, or 
selling the patented invention.155  Patent applications have specific 
disclosure requirements, embodied in 35 U.S.C. § 112, which include:  
describing the claimed invention in sufficient detail such that (1) 
“one skilled in the art can reasonably conclude that the inventor has 
possession of the claimed invention” and (2) one skilled in the art 
can make and use the application’s defined claims.156  In other words, 
a patent must “particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[]” the 
invention.157  A patent’s term may extend beyond any FDA exclusivity 
period; because additional clinical trials are incentivized with FDA 
approval extensions, biologics manufacturers can test new methods 
and tools of manufacture within the scope and duration of previously 
patented claims.158  Furthermore, patents offer protection capabilities 
not available under the BPCIA, especially with respect to 
manufacturing process alterations and potential new therapeutic uses 
stemming from process changes. 
Biologic drugs having larger, more complex structures than small-
molecule drugs illustrates the additional difficulties within patent 
protection of biological products.  There is more potential for design-
arounds:  an RPS cannot broaden its patent to incorporate minor 
design-arounds or encompass claims not originally enabled by the 
                                               
develops, this duration will likely shorten and the manufacturer will need more 
incentive to pursue aBLA exclusivity grants. 
 155. § 271(a). 
 156. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., MPEP §§ 2163, 2164 (9th ed. Rev. 7, Nov. 2015) 
[hereinafter MPEP]. 
 157. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b).  Acting as a lever to spur scientific advancement, the 
degree of distinctly claiming an invention inherently changes as scientific 
achievements enable manufacturers to piece together how process parameters 
correlate with final product attributes. 
 158. If the operational regulatory philosophy is to provide society with a greater 
guarantee of safety, the FDA would necessitate clinical trials.  Dudzinski, supra note 
75, at 232.  Because clinical trials are necessary for any change in safety, efficacy, or 
purity, this provides manufacturers with an opportunity to show manufacturability 
and thus patentability. 
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patent’s specification.159  Nevertheless, the cost of designing the 
manufacturing process, instituting clinical trials, and obtaining FOB 
product approval acts as a barrier in itself—fewer parties will 
challenge the validity of its patents (compared to small-molecule 
RPSs) and fewer instances of prior art establishing anticipation or 
obviousness, ensuring more patents remain valid.160  Due to these 
inherent barriers and the ability to threaten enforcement of patents 
covering biologics after the twelve-year exclusivity period, patents will 
continue to play a governing role in protection, disclosure, and 
innovation for biologics manufacturers. 
A. Claiming User Rights for Biologics and Biosimilar Manufacturers 
Pioneer biologics and FOB sponsors have similar disclosure 
concerns for patentable subject matter and subsequent claim scope 
requirements.  A Biologic’s patent application claims typically fall in 
one of three categories:  (1) composition claims,161 (2) 
method/process claims,162 and (3) source claims.163  Because biologic 
products are closely correlated to their manufacturing 
method/process, composition claims and method/process claims are 
intertwined.164  Therefore, when an applicant is deciding whether to 
                                               
 159. See 35 U.S.C. § 132(a); MPEP § 2163.06. 
 160. Gaudry, supra note 22, at 617. 
 161. Price, Making Do in Making Drugs, supra note 103, at 525 (“[A] patent on the 
drug’s active ingredient allows the patentee to exclude others from making, selling, or 
using the drug for any use, even those uses not specifically envisioned by the patentee.”). 
 162. Price, Regulating Secrecy, supra note 33, at 1807 (“[M]ethod patents are 
particularly hard to enforce in part because methods are kept secret, so infringement 
frequently goes unobserved.”).  But see id. (“If firms effectively disclose their methods, 
observing patent infringement becomes easier, which increases incentives to pursue 
patents in the first place.”).  “[P]rocess elements should not limit the scope of a 
claim to a novel product . . . because process elements cannot impart novelty to a 
composition claim directed to a known product . . . .”  Dmitry Karshtedt, Limits on 
Hard-to-Reproduce Inventions:  Process Elements and Biotechnology’s Compliance with the 
Enablement Requirement, 3 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 109, 121–22 (2010) (citing Scripps 
Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). 
 163. See generally Price, Regulating Secrecy, supra note 33. 
 164. Composition claims, however, have traditionally been considered much more 
powerful than process claims.  These types of claims may prove to provide broad 
patent protection as well as information sharing and ultimately can aid innovation in 
the field.  Feldman & Price, supra note 103, at 792.  Composition claims are uniquely 
appropriate for claiming certain products of biotechnology “when the product is new 
and unobvious, but has a process-based limitation.”  Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex 
Corp., 974 F.2d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Newman, J., dissenting) (citing E.P. 
 
ELEVI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/2017  6:37 PM 
944 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:911 
protect a novel and nonobvious claim, biologics and biosimilars 
manufacturers have a significant incentive to determine realistic ROI 
by analyzing patent and trade secrecy protection enforcement 
capabilities.165  Furthermore, when a successful drug sponsor is 
awarded a guaranteed limited market monopoly, the company will 
more easily justify the expense and risk of R&D.166 
B. Obtaining the Right to Exclude 
Biologics manufacturers constantly evaluate the value of their 
manufacturing processes.  Manufacturing drift is an opportunity for 
biologics manufacturers to reassess their manufacturing processes.  
These necessary reassessments during exclusivity periods provide 
opportunities for manufacturers to determine how to improve their 
process.  Therefore, an assessment of patentable subject matter and 
trade secret protection guide each applicants’ level of disclosure; 
because patent law prevents inventors from receiving both patent and 
trade secret protection, a biologics manufacturer must also evaluate 
which mode of protection best suits its innovation and corporate-
market goals.167 
1. Patentability hurdles for biologics and biosimilars 
Patentable subject matter is a baseline criterion that each 
manufacturer must assess prior to pursuing protection and/or 
exclusivity grants.  Patentable subject matter is “any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new 
                                               
Mirabel, Product-by-Process Claims:  A Practical Perspective, 68 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 3 (1986)). 
 165. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (setting out the conditions for patentability based 
on novelty); § 103 (setting out the conditions for patentability based on non-obvious 
subject matter).  Patent law encourages disclosure of new discoveries in return for 
limited grants of exclusivity, while trade secret laws appear to encourage 
concealment of new discoveries, allowing concealed knowledge to be exploited for 
an indefinite period of time; see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 
480–81 (1973).  For products whose structure cannot be determined precisely, 
process limitations may be the only choice for ensuring the claim meets the 
enablement requirement. 
 166. Gaudry, supra note 22, at 590.  The incentive to innovate (or incentive to 
commercialize), which includes the entire process of research, development, and 
turning an idea into an economically viable finished product, is commonly 
recognized as one of three patent/economic theories.  CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW 
OF PATENTS 34–36 (4th ed. 2016).  The other two theories are the incentive to invent 
and the incentive to disclose.  Id. 
 167. J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917, 923 (2011). 
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and useful improvement.”168  Patents grant their holder exclusive 
rights for a fixed period.169  Seemingly anticompetitive, patents 
represent a legal “right to exclude,” producing a limited monopoly.170 
The patent application is first received by the USPTO, where a 
prima facie determination is made as to the sufficiency of the 
application’s completion.171  Thus, the USPTO determines the scope 
of a patent, which influences the development of technology—both 
regarding standards of current applicant material and future 
development upon disclosed information.172 
There are essentially four requirements or hurdles for patentability 
and approval of the patent application:  (1) statutory subject 
matter,173 (2) non-obviousness,174 (3) novelty,175 and (4) descriptive 
                                               
 168. 35 U.S.C. § 101.  Inventors cannot patent laws of nature, natural phenomena, 
or abstract ideas; however, courts have struggled with what constitutes an abstract 
idea and what constitutes an inventive concept because “any claim, described at a 
certain level of generality, can be challenged as directed to an abstract idea.”  
Fairfield Indus. v. Wireless Seismic, Inc., No. 4:1-CV-2972, 2014 WL 7342525, at *4 
(S.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2014); Steven M. Amundson, The Supreme Court’s Decision in Alice 
Corp. v. CLS Bank Has Taken a Heavy Toll on Patents for Computer Related Inventions, 
FROMMER LAWRENCE & HAUG LLP (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.flhlaw.com/insights/ 
Detail.aspx?news=2854e313-72d2-4a5c-a27a-4a9a10ff34e5&.  After the 2014 decision 
in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) (holding that an abstract idea is not 
patentable), about seventy percent of challenges for failure to claim patent-eligible 
subject matter have succeeded.  Amundson, supra. 
 169. Epstein, supra note 94, at 288. 
 170. Id. at 315; Brian J. Love & Christopher B. Seaman, Best Mode Trade Secrets, 15 
YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 5 (2012). 
 171. AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding 
that “the language of the claim frames and ultimately resolves all issues of claim 
interpretation”), amended by 131 F.3d 1009 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 172. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 7, at 840, 842; supra notes 156–57 and 
accompanying text. 
 173. 35 U.S.C. § 101.  Statutory subject matter determines what can and cannot be 
patented, with a societal benefit or usefulness nexus. 
 174. § 103.  “‘Section 101 is not so narrow’ as to prevent the patenting of any 
innovative method that acts on something naturally occurring.”  David A. Zwally, The 
Federal Circuit Clarifies the Scope of § 101 in Pharmaceutical Related Patents, FROMMER 
LAWURENCE & HAUG LLP (July 5, 2016), http://www.flhlaw.com/The-Federal-Circuit-
Clarifies-the-Scope-of--101-in-Pharmaceutical-Related-Patents-07-11-20161.  Thus, 
even if you are the first inventor to conceptualize and reduce to practice, the 
invention must be a large enough leap or difference from what came before that 
patenting is warranted and deserved. 
 175. § 102.  Novelty is an assessment of whether an invention has been done 
before.  There are inherent statutory and priority bars encompassed in the novelty 
provision:  even if you invent something new, there may be something an applicant 
has done, such as public disclosure of the invention’s particulars before securing the 
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requirements.176  The descriptive requirement177 is most important 
for biological sponsors and innovators because it mandates public 
disclosure of the best mode178 contemplated at the time of 
application.179  Courts tend not to treat patents that merely improve 
prior art as equivalents.180  However, when a patent represents a 
pioneer, novel invention with societal value and impact, courts tend 
                                               
patent, to preclude its ability to patent; and when two patents cover the same claims, 
only one can be said to have priority over the other. 
 176. § 112.  Descriptiveness requires adequate disclosure and claiming, embodied 
by three requirements:  enablement, written description, and definiteness.  In other 
words, an applicant must describe the invention with enough definitiveness so “as to 
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains . . . to make and use” the 
invention.  Id. 
 177. Love & Seaman, supra note 170, at 5 (stating that enablement “requires a 
patentee to provide enough information ‘for a person skilled in the art to make and 
use the invention without undue experimentation’” (quoting In re Wands, 858 F.2d 
731, 735 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).  Reproducibility and operability of the process play a 
critical role in determining whether the manufacturer will disclose enough 
information for enablement, yet withhold critical process parameters from being 
analyzed and used by another manufacturer/reverse-engineer. 
 178. See id. (explaining that best mode is “the best mode contemplated by him, as 
of the time he executes the application, of carrying out the invention” and “helps fill 
the gap between enablement’s minimum disclosure and the inventor’s own 
knowledge about her preferred implementation of the invention.  [The] purpose ‘is 
to restrain inventors from applying for patents while at the same time concealing 
from the public preferred embodiments of the inventions they have in fact 
conceived’” (quoting Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1330 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002)).  But see S. 515 111th Cong. § 14 (2009) (providing that a “failure to 
disclose the best mode shall not be a basis on which any claim of a patent may be 
canceled or held invalid or otherwise unenforceable”).  Even though the bill died, 
both chambers passed bills in 2011 that were substantively identical to the 2009 
Senate bill regarding best mode.  H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. § 15 (2011) (as passed by 
House, June 23, 2011); S. 23, 112th Cong. § 15 (2011) (as passed by Senate, Mar. 8, 
2011).  The Senate ultimately approved the House’s version of patent reform without 
amendment on Sept. 8, 2011.  157 Cong. Rec. S5442 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) 
(approved 89–9)). 
 179. 35 U.S.C. § 112; see also Love & Seaman, supra note 170, at 5 (detailing that 
enablement has both subjective and objective components:  the subjective 
component asks “‘whether the inventor considered a particular mode of practicing 
the invention to be superior to all other modes at the time of filling’ the 
application,” and then, if so, the objective question becomes whether the applicant 
“adequately disclose[d] the mode . . . considered to be superior” (quoting Teleflex, 
299 F.3d at 1330). 
 180. Merges & Nelson, supra note 7, at 860.  However, “short of uncovering a 
smoking gun in discovery, an accused infringer often cannot tell ex post that a trade 
secret asserted today was the patentee’s best mode years prior.”  Love & Seaman, 
supra note 170, at 13. 
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to provide broader ranges of entitlement.181  When an innovation 
represents a wholly novel formulation, clearly progressing the art of 
science, it will receive a larger scope of patent protection.182 
2. Premise of trade secrecy while adjusting to the AIA 
Biologics manufacturing processes are large and complex systems 
where small changes may eliminate effectiveness or raise safety concerns.  
Similarly, claimed or patented biologics manufacturing processes restrict 
protection of manufacturing to precisely the claimed process, making 
reverse-engineering or design-around claims easy to discover.  Trade 
secrets offer certainty in a consistently evolving biologics market 
dominated by uncertain patent scope and claim protection. 
Trade secrets include “any information that can be used in the 
operation of a business or other enterprise,” in which such 
knowledge is “sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or 
potential economic advantage over others.”183  Such value of trade 
secrets in biologics applications applies to manufacturing processes, 
which “may consist of any commercially valuable plan, formula, 
process, or device that is used for the making, preparing, 
compounding, or processing of trade commodities and that can be 
said to be the end product of either innovation or substantial 
effort.”184  However, the most important aspect of trade secrecy is that 
the secret actually remains a secret; without secrecy the applicant’s 
rights would “evaporate.”185 
Trade secret policy is premised on the applicant’s due diligence in 
determining the degree of economic value received from a trade secret’s 
                                               
 181. Merges & Nelson, supra note 7, at 854. 
 182. Id. 
 183. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (AM. LAW INST. 1995); 
Epstein, supra note 94, at 289, 301, 307; see also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 
U.S. 986, 1003–04 (1984) (asserting that safety and effectiveness data submitted by 
Monsanto to the Environmental Protection Agency was a property interest 
cognizable by the Takings Clause insofar as the information was protected by the 
laws of Missouri as a trade secret). 
 184. 21 C.F.R. § 20.61(a) (2016); see also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 1979) (amended 1985) (defining a trade secret as any information that derives 
actual or potential economic value from “not being readily ascertainable” and that is “the 
subject of [measures] reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy”); 
Epstein, supra note 94, at 289 (providing additional definitions for “trade secret” from the 
Third Restatement of Unfair Competition and the First Restatement of Torts). 
 185. Love & Seaman, supra note 170, at 3. 
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competitive edge.186  Simultaneously, this due diligence dissolves any 
Takings Clause concerns.187  Takings concerns are built into the Federal 
Trade Secrets Act, which effectively prevents FDA regulators from 
“disclosing ‘any information’ that relates to ‘trade secrets, processes, 
operations, style of work, or apparatus’ if the information was obtained” 
as part of the operation of the regulators’ job.188 
The FDA takes a broad stance in defining manufacturing processes 
and designs for trade secrecy purposes.189  There can feasibly be a per 
se taking of a manufacturing process—whether it is a patent or trade 
secret.190  However, per se takings issues premised on any type of 
notice provided in legislation will dissolve these claims as the 
government is providing compensation in the form of market 
exclusivity and patent exclusivity rights. 
Lastly, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”) of 2011191 plays 
an important role in the decision making process for applicants.192  Not 
only do biologics and biosimilars applications require a certain 
threshold of safety and efficacy data, but patent applications also require 
a minimum level of disclosure.193  The disclosure process during patent 
application approval and the patent dance (an infringement or 
invalidity assertion) includes providing an application with the “best 
mode” when reduced to practice and an inter partes review proceeding to 
                                               
 186. An inventor’s choice of trade secrecy illustrates her belief that research costs 
can be recouped without the advantages and drawbacks of patent exclusivity.  
Anderson, supra note 167, at 938. 
 187. See Epstein, supra note 94, at 324. 
 188. Id. at 289. 
 189. Id. at 290. 
 190. See id. at 299 (explaining that a per se taking of intellectual property does not 
require “physical dispossession”). 
 191. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
 192. See generally Love & Seaman, supra note 170, at 3–4 (asserting that the 
America Invents Act (AIA) has blurred the dividing line between patents and trade 
secrets because the validity of patents no longer hinges on whether an applicant 
discloses the best mode). 
 193. Id. at 5; see also Stanley S. Wang & John J. Smith, Potential Legal Barriers to 
Increasing CMS/FDA Collaboration:  The Law of Trade Secrets and Related Considerations, 
58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 613, 617 (2003) (stating that “a marketing application’s 
contents is governed by . . . 21 C.F.R. part 20, reflecting agency policy to[] ‘make the 
fullest possible disclosure of records to the public, consistent with the rights of 
individuals to privacy, the property rights of persons in trade secrets and confidential 
commercial or financial information, and the need for the agency to promote frank 
internal policy deliberations and to pursue its regulatory activities without 
disruption’” (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 20.20(a) (2016)). 
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determine directly whether the parties assert infringement.194  Thus, the 
AIA is generally known to aid with establishing broad prior user rights 
through disclosure requirements, thereby implicating trade-secrecy 
valuations for originators and applicants.195 
Due to the dramatic increase in litigation since the AIA’s 
implementation caused by patent trolls,196 the Innovation Act197 was 
introduced on October 23, 2013.  Even though the Innovation Act has 
not been approved, the underlying contention is that discovery 
procedures and claim construction play a critical role in abating the 
impact of patent trolls.198  Still, these protections are not enough, and 
the rise in litigation will “increase the level of investment and risk 
associated with enforcing patent rights,” further pushing biologics 
manufacturers towards trade secrecy protection.199  The increase in costs 
from pre-suit investigations and “loser pays”200 systems may ultimately 
                                               
 194. See Love & Seaman, supra note 170, at 13; supra note 180. 
 195. See Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs. Ltd., No. 11-3962, 2016 WL 
832089 (D.N.J. Mar. 3, 2106) (holding that the inventors’ non-informing 
exploitation of the invention was not patent defeating prior art).  Parties that exploit 
secret inventions may continue their use even after a third-party patents the same 
invention; before the AIA, the first inventor could have been sued by a second who 
happened to be first to patent.  See Love & Seaman, supra note 170, at 15 (“[T]he 
AIA’s expansion of prior user rights considerably reduces the risks associated with 
protecting preferred embodiments as trade secrets.”). 
196. Elizabeth J. Murphy, H.R. 3309, The Innovation Act, FROMMER LAWRENCE & 
HAUG LLP (Dec. 6, 2013), http://www.flhlaw.com/insights/Detail.aspx?news=3f5f0d 
02-4972-42df-b411-263ae1b72fa4&.  Patent trolls, also known “as non-practicing 
entities, patent assertion entities, and patent monetizers,” are beginning to infiltrate 
non-core or auxiliary patents—such as manufacturing processes—due to the 
complex nature of life sciences patents and litigations.  Feldman & Price, supra note 
103, at 773–75, 777, 781.  Patent trolls use patents as bargaining chips to charge 
exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy a license to practice a patent.  For 
Unified Patents’ statistical analysis of patent quality and high risk troll activity zones, 
see Transactions, UNIFIED PATS., https://www.unifiedpatents.com/transactions (last 
visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
 197. H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 198. Murphy, supra note 196 (explaining that the Innovation Act would have 
heightened pleading requirements, shifted fees, limited discovery before claim 
construction, and established patent ownership transparency in order to place a 
higher burden on these trolls). 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. (explaining that “loser pays” means that “the nonprevailing party pays 
reasonable fees and costs unless its position and conduct is . . . ‘reasonably 
justified’”). 
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discourage patentees from seeking to protect their rights as eagerly.201  
Generally though, the Innovation Act drives toward transparency in 
return for increased disclosure by—and protection of—patentees.202 
IV. CURRENT STATE AND THE IDEAL STATE OF INNOVATION IN 
BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS 
Biologics manufacturers value their manufacturing processes and 
determine whether protection and exclusivity grants are more certain 
and more valuable than trade secrecy.  The recent decision in Amgen 
Inc. v. Apotex Inc. held that the biosimilars’ notice of commercial 
marketing is required regardless of whether the applicant partook in a 
patent dance.203  Additionally, the decision in Amgen Inc. v. Hospira, 
Inc.204 prevented Amgen from obtaining manufacturing information 
from Hospira deemed non-relevant to the patents-in-suit.  Lastly, the 
U.S. Supreme Court will review the Federal Circuit’s decision in Amgen 
Inc. v. Sandoz Inc.205 and assess whether the biosimilar maker must 
provide advance notice of marketing—essentially influencing whether 
the RPS will reap an additional six-month exclusivity period post-aBLA 
approval—and whether the applicant must participate in the patent 
dance with the RPS.206  The decision will not only impact the type and 
degree of manufacturing information exchanged between applicant 
and sponsor, but it will also affect how quickly consumers will be able 
                                               
 201. Id. (declaring that the Innovation Act “also provides grounds for an alleged 
infringer to challenge the sufficiency of initial pleadings before engaging in the 
merits of the case”). 
 202. See id. (recognizing that the Innovation Act “mandates an ‘ongoing’ duty to 
disclose patent ownership information . . . within 90 days” of any update, and that 
“[f]ailure to comply” with the mandate may result in fees, expenses, and damages). 
 203. Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 
No. 16-332, 2016 WL 4944497 (U.S. Dec. 12, 2016).  A notice of commercial 
marketing informs the RPS that their customer market will soon be undercut.  To 
adapt, the RPS will need to sell its drug at a lower price or explain to its consumers 
why its product is worth a higher price than its competitor’s, such as a better 
manufacturing process.  Because a biosimilars manufacturer does not have to 
provide the notice to the RPS until after market approval, the RPS should have this 
information readily available to adapt prior to the end of its market exclusivity. 
 204. No. 15-839-RGA, 2016 WL 7013483 (D. Del. Nov. 30, 2016), appeal filed, 16-
2179 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 25, 2016). 
 205. 794 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 84 U.S.L.W. 3549 (U.S. Jan. 13, 
2017) (Nos. 15-1039, 15-1195). 
 206. U.S. SUPREME COURT, 15-1039 SANDOZ INC. V. AMGEN INC.:  QUESTION PRESENTED, 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/15-01039qp.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
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to purchase cheaper biosimilars.207  These judicial decisions not only 
illustrate the value applicants place on exclusivity grant durations and 
their underlying manufacturing processes,208 but they also provide 
bases for interpreting regulatory provisions and conducting ROI 
calculations.  Based upon current judicial209 and legislative trends as 
well as consumer demand, data exclusivity valuations have encouraged 
investment into FOBs as opposed to novel, less lucrative, and highly 
specialized disease treatments.210 
A. Shape-up or Shake-up from Judicial Decisions:  Enhancing the Value of 
Exclusivity 
Even though judicial decisions do not directly address whether 
market or data exclusivity periods provide a proper degree of 
incentive to innovate biologics manufacturing processes, these 
decisions influence whether pioneers and subsequent innovators seek 
those exclusivities.  In the last three decades, courts have shaped 
these incentives in the biologics market.211  For instance, in Scripps 
Clinic & Research Foundation v. Genentech, Inc.,212 the Northern District 
of California held that Scripps, a nonprofit research organization, did 
not disclose the purification method that embodied the best mode at 
the time the application was submitted.213  A robust disclosure of the 
scientific methodology reinforces applicants’, as well as pioneers’, 
ability to predict potential claims of subsequent innovators, and their 
use of process terms inherently limits the scope of product-by-process 
                                               
 207. Jeff Overley, High Court Takes up Amgen-Sandoz Biosimilar Brawl, LAW360 (Jan. 
13, 2017, 2:53 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/792493/high-court-takes-up-
amgen-sandoz-biosimilar-brawl. 
 208. See Woodage, supra note 39, at 16 (explaining that applicants have to “thread 
[a] needle” by using manufacturing processes different enough not to infringe, yet 
similar enough to meet biosimilarity standards). 
 209. As of October 2016, there were five ongoing biologic/biosimilar lawsuits, in 
addition to Amgen v. Apotex (Neulasta/pegfilgrastim), Amgen v. Hospira 
(Epogen/epoetin alfa), and Amgen v. Sandoz (Neupogen/filgrastim).  Aron Fischer, 
Biosimilar Litigation Update, BIOLOGICS BLOG (Oct. 25, 2016), 
http://www.biologicsblog.com/blog/biosimilar-litigation-update. 
 210. Sorscher, supra note 17, at 303. 
 211. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1298–
1300, 1302, 1305 (2012) (illustrating patent protection as a “two edged sword,” potentially 
“tie[ing] up too much future use” and therefore requiring claims to possess a degree of 
specificity and enhancement relevant to the pertinent scientific community). 
 212. 707 F. Supp. 1547 (N.D. Cal. 1989), rev’d, 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991), 
overruled by Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
 213. Id. at 1554–55. 
ELEVI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/2017  6:37 PM 
952 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:911 
claims.  The first Federal Circuit court ruling in Scripps explained that 
“claims are construed independent of the accused product, in light of 
the specification, the prosecution history, and the prior art.”214  Thus, 
by limiting the scope of the claims to specific manufacturing 
processes, applicants are able to ensure noninfringement by 
engineering around a pioneer’s best mode at the time their 
application was filed.215  Similarly, the Federal Circuit in Atlantic 
Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp.216 held that if an accused infringer of 
a composition claim with a process limitation can show that the 
product was made by a different process, then there can be no 
warranted finding of infringement.217  Interpreting the Atlantic 
Thermoplastics and Scripps decisions in tandem, “infringement requires 
the presence of every claim limitation or its equivalent,” otherwise the 
limitation does not read on the claim and subsequent innovators 
have freedom to operate.218 
The claim limitation concept is directly applicable to biologics 
innovators attempting to assert subservient patents against an RPS’s 
dominant patent.  The RPS may attempt to create early, broad patents, 
which would disincentivize FOB manufacturers and subsequent 
pioneers’ process refinement assessments.  However, the Atlantic 
Thermoplastics and Scripps decisions incentivize research in new and 
creative modes of manufacturing the same biological product with 
alternative manufacturing processes, or different biological products 
with similar claims but non-equivalent limitations.  As biologics 
quantification methodology improves, pioneers will carve out highly 
refined composition claims of their own, enhancing discernibility of 
infringing claims.  Ultimately, increased competition will ensure that 
the best manufacturing processes dominate the market. 
                                               
 214. Scripps, 927 F.2d at 1580.  If the patent claims are “granted on the product, 
rather than the process for making it, subsequent process research by others will be 
discouraged.”  Merges & Nelson, supra note 7, at 904. 
 215. Even though equivalency in manufacturing process is measured at the time 
of infringement, validity—the claim scope embodied in § 112’s requirements—is 
measured at the time of filing. 
 216. 970 F.2d 834 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 217. Id. at 846–47. 
 218. Id. at 846.  Compare Scripps, 927 F.2d at 1583 (emphasizing that the product of 
a product-by-process claim is not limited by the process steps recited in the claim for 
purposes of analyzing alleged infringement), with Atl. Thermoplastics, 970 F.2d at 846–
47 (articulating that process limitations in a product-by-process claim cannot be 
ignored when evaluating alleged infringement). 
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The Federal Circuit has also made strides towards reinforcing 
process innovation.  In Abbott Laboratories v. Sandoz, Inc.,219 for 
example, the Federal Circuit explicitly overruled Scripps and adopted 
the rule from Atlantic Thermoplastics.220  The Federal Circuit in Abbott 
held that process limitations in product-by-process claims are as 
effective as limitations in an infringement analysis.221  Therefore, a 
biologics manufacturer claiming a process for making a 
biopharmaceutical compound can protect the process from 
infringement, even when a different pharmaceutical is produced by 
the process.  And in Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC,222 the Federal Circuit 
was concerned with composition claims whose properties or 
structures are highly process- or source-dependent,223 a concept vitally 
important to biologics manufacturers.  Because § 112 requires one 
skilled in the art to practice “the full scope of the claimed 
invention,”224 reproducibility within the scientific and manufacturing 
communities requires operating and verifying the process or source 
limitations, without undue experimentation.225  Ultimately, the 
Federal Circuit held that the patentee’s broad claim language 
surpassed the teachings—or scope of enablement—within the patent 
specification, and the claims were therefore non-commensurate with 
the enrichment of public knowledge.226 
                                               
 219. 566 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
 220. Id. at 1291, 1293. 
 221. Id. at 1293–95. 
 222. 516 F.3d 993 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 223. See id. at 995–96 (discussing a dispute over video game versus movie technology). 
 224. Id. at 1000. 
 225. Karshtedt, supra note 162, at 116, 155. 
 226. Sitrick, 516 F.3d at 999 (citing Auto. Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 
501 F.3d 1274, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).  In U.S. patent law, claims define the scope of 
legal protection that the federal government grants to the owner or exclusive 
licensee of a patent.  See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012) (establishing that a patent 
application shall include “one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly 
claiming . . . the invention”); see also § 154(a) (addressing the rights of a patent 
owner or licensee, the patent term, and the content of a patent).  But when 
construed in view of the recent Phillips decision, “claim construction [can] result in a 
narrower claim scope.”  Bryan J. Braunel, USPTO Amends AIA Rules, FROMMER 
LAWRENCE & HAUG LLP (May 3, 2016), http://www.flhlaw.com/USPTO-Amends-AIA-
Rules-05-03-2016.  Similarly, the Supreme Court in Association for Molecular Pathology 
v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013), was particularly interested in retaining 
sufficient incentives for biotech firms to ensure future innovation is not inhibited.  
Id. at 2116 (addressing patent breadth with respect to DNA, which is best described 
by its structure rather than by function).  After all, “too broad an interpretation of 
this exclusionary principle” will limit incentive to protect novel, societally beneficial 
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The Senate’s unanimous approval of the Defend Trade Secrets Act 
(DTSA)227 on April 4, 2016, should reinforce the security of 
innovators’ property rights.228  Creating a baseline for enabled 
disclosure while reinforcing trade secret viability ensures innovators 
focus their time and monetary investments towards holes in prior art; 
thus, increasing the value of enabled innovation. 
The Federal Circuit recognizes that biological product applications 
have interrelated claims—source, composition, and process claims 
may all be part of an applicant’s claimed biopharmaceutical.229  
Biologics manufacturers see the capabilities that biologics licenses 
provide, yet they strategically navigate the statutory and regulatory 
framework to minimize scientific knowledge disclosure.230  Sitrick 
exemplifies how the Federal Circuit requires essential, reproducible 
knowledge for enablement in an application, knowing those same 
claims may be used to limit competition in the future.231 
Still, the Supreme Court’s FTC v. Actavis, Inc.232 and Third Circuit’s 
Mylan Pharmaceuticals v. Warner Chilcott233 decisions have cast a shadow 
over the biologics market, potentially affecting an alleged infringer’s 
ability to receive payment in return for staying off the market for a 
specific period.234  At issue in both cases was whether a viable antitrust 
challenge may be claimed against a pay-for-delay, or reverse-payment 
settlement, scheme.  Essentially, the underlying actions at issue involved 
“product hopping,” whereby insignificant modifications are made to the 
                                               
inventions that all, to some degree, “embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of 
nature natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.”  Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. 
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012). 
 227. Pub. L. No. 114-529 (2016). 
 228. Jessica L. Sblendorio, The Defend Trade Secrets Act:  A Remedy Background and 
Implementation, FROMMER LAWRENCE & HAUG LLP (Apr. 28, 2016), 
http://www.flhlaw.com/DefendTradeSecrets. 
 229. Amgen Inc. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., 580 F.3d 1340, 1358–68 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 230. Minimizing patent and regulatory disclosure reinforces licensing schemes, 
such that licensees must purchase competitor’s materials in order to feasibly 
manufacture and commercialize the biologic independently.  Dan L. Burk, 
Misappropriation of Trade Secrets in Biotechnology Licensing, 4 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 121, 
140 (1994).  In the biologics manufacturing industry, inventors would retain 
“essential know-how” through secrecy while obtaining patent protection with 
strategic disclosure.  Anderson, supra note 167, at 941. 
 231. Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 999, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 232. 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
 233. 838 F.3d 421 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 234. Tucker & Wells, supra note 39, at 102.  See generally Joshua B. Fischman, The 
Circular Logic of Actavis, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 91 (2016). 
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pioneer drug, extending the drug’s exclusivity, thereby forcing 
subsequent generic competitors off the market and requiring they re-
start the regulatory process.235  Relevant to the biologics industry are the 
outer edges of these decisions, which required applicants to come to the 
table with product reformulations that provide patient benefits.236  Once 
patient benefits are proven to the reference product manufacturer, 
these case decisions provide reason to believe that any reverse-payment 
settlements would be permitted as an economically efficient means to 
resolve infringement litigation.237  Thus, societal health impact is an 
inherent consideration and bar that innovators must surmount to justify 
their reasonable, investment-backed expectations. 
Lastly, Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc. was the first Federal Circuit 
decision to substantively interpret the BPCIA.238  The Supreme 
Court’s decision to review the Federal Circuit’s ruling “will have a 
significant economic impact on both reference product sponsors and 
biosimilar applicants.”239  The Amgen decision from 2015 held that (1) 
a biosimilar applicant is not required to participate in the patent 
exchange procedure outlined within section 351(I) of the PHSA, and 
(2) a biosimilar applicant must provide the reference product sponsor 
with 180 days’ notice of commercial marketing only after the FDA 
approves the biosimilar application.240 
Nevertheless, biosimilar applicants may currently choose to not 
participate in the patent exchange process.241  Even though the 
Federal Circuit holding gives a biosimilar applicant more control 
over patent disclosure and litigation processes, the RPS will not have 
the benefit of the patent exchange procedure to determine similarity 
to an FOB and its manufacturing processes, making it more difficult 
for the RPS to meet heightened pleading requirements.242 
                                               
 235. Mylan, 838 F.3d at 426; see also Mark S. Levy, Big Pharma Monopoly:  Why 
Consumers Keep Landing on “Park Place” and How the Game Is Rigged, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 
247, 276–79 (2016) (defining product hopping’s roll in anticompetitive schemes 
carried out by pharmaceutical companies). 
 236. Tucker & Wells, supra note 39, at 104. 
 237. Id. at 103. 
 238. Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1351–62 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. 
granted, 84 U.S.L.W. 3549 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2017) (Nos. 15-1039, 15-1195). 
 239. Colletti & Worley, supra note 145. 
 240. Amgen, 794 F.3d 1356–58, 1360; see also Colletti & Worley, supra note 145. 
 241. Colletti & Worley, supra note 145. 
 242. Id. (“[Section] 351(I)(9)(C) does not adequately address a reference product 
sponsor’s needs because it is only directed to composition and method of use claims 
and not manufacturing and process claims.”); see also Courtenay C. Brinckerhoff, 
 
ELEVI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/2017  6:37 PM 
956 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:911 
B. Incentivizing High-Quality Innovation for Biologics Manufacturers 
The biologics regulatory pathway must enable biologics 
manufacturers to respond quickly to scientific and technological 
growth.  A biopharmaceutical market that constantly reassesses and 
protects innovation will incentivize manufacturers to disclose new 
manufacturing process knowledge in return for grants of 
exclusivity.243  Innovation reflects a stronger grasp of process 
knowledge.  Manufacturers typically innovate upon prior art and 
patent novel processes when the short-term sacrifice is worth the 
long-term return.244  Biosimilars innovation takes the forms of 
“enhanced overall design,”245 new therapeutic uses for approved 
drugs,246 and lower costs for consumers.  Cumulative innovation is 
particularly applicable to biologics and biosimilars manufacturing 
processes during the current rapid growth of the biosimilars 
market.247  Cumulative innovation includes better processes for 
manufacturing a similar drug248 and safer, more efficacious drugs 
from more controlled manufacturing processes.249 
                                               
AbbVie Sues Amgen on 10 of 100 Humira Patents (Aug. 9, 2016), 
https://www.foley.com/abbvie-sues-amgen-on-10-of-100-humira-patents-08-09-2016 
(showing that leading the first round of the patent dance enables the biosimilar 
applicant to strategically target weaker RPS claims). 
 243. Cf. Jennifer L. Bachorik & Courtenay C. Brinckerhoff, USPTO Launches 
Patents 4 Patients, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP (Aug. 2, 2016), https://www.foley.com/uspto 
-launches-patents-4-patients-08-02-2016 (illustrating that frequent disclosure 
opportunities and constant incentive to innovate may be more important than an 
expedited approval process). 
 244. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 7, at 878 (emphasis omitted) (assuming 
innovation responds quickly to market demands and introduces consumers to new 
improvements). 
 245. See id. at 859. 
 246. See id. at 883.  But see W. Nicholson Price II & Timo Minssen, Will Clinical Trial 
Data Disclosure Reduce Incentives to Develop New Uses of Drugs?, 33 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 685, 685 (2015) (revealing that not all new uses for approved or 
patented drugs are patentable). 
 247. Merges & Nelson, supra note 7, at 898.  The capacity and opportunity to 
innovate increases as the industry develops new drugs and prepares for the 
development of future therapeutic uses.  See Price, Innovation Policy Failures, supra 
note 8, at 346.  For a discussion of why prospective patenting is of particular 
relevance where there is a continuum—or series—of opportunities to develop the 
commercialization of biologics while responding to market demands, see generally 
Nithya Anand, Accommodating Long Term Scientific Progress:  Patent Prospects in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 16 J. INTELL. PROP. RTS. 17 (2010). 
 248. Huzair & Kale, supra note 38, at 251. 
 249. Id. 
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Quality, on the other hand, creates a scale to measure innovation.  
Quality assessments typically require comparative analyses but also 
require fiscal justification for enhanced process control, and new 
product formulation and design.250  These regulation-mandated quality 
assessments are important because, from the viewpoint of a market 
consumer, quality is hard to observe.251  Once a drug is approved for 
sale in commerce, the regulatory structure has difficulty “detect[ing] 
quality problems and impos[ing] restrained response[s].”252 
High-quality innovation stems from information sharing.253  Just as 
there are degrees of information sharing,254 there are degrees of quality, 
and the incentive structure must account for these varying innovation 
levels and their impact on societal health.255  Clinical superiority, 
required by the Orphan Drug Act regulations, is demonstrated by 
therapeutic advantages from clinical trials or major contributions to 
patient care.256  The current four- and twelve-year regimented structures 
do not keep pace with science; biologics manufacturing processes drift 
with time, and if a manufacturer can obtain more process control, then 
it should not feel restricted to wait until their exclusivity period lapses.  
Altering manufacturing processes in pursuit of clinically superior 
biologics will occur in a less regimented exclusivity structure.  
Therapeutically advantageous products, in return for regulatory 
                                               
 250. Price, Making Do in Making Drugs, supra note 103, at 559. 
 251. See id. at 558–59 n.429 (noting that particularly for sterile injectable drugs, 
consumers already have compromised immune systems, making differentiation 
between drug contamination and infection difficult). 
 252. Id. at 559.  For an illustrative example of systemic quality issues from one of 
the United States’ largest sterile, injectable drug manufacturers, Hospira, see Zachary 
Brennan, Slew of Recalls, Form 483 Shake Hospira, IN-PHARMA TECHNOLOGIST (Mar. 9, 
2015) http://www.in-pharmatechnologist.com/Regulatory-Safety/Slew-of-recalls-Form-
483-shake-Hospira. 
 253. See W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, Manufacturing Barriers to Biologics 
Competition and Innovation, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1023, 1030 (2016) [hereinafter 
Manufacturing Barriers]. 
 254. Id. at 1030, 1045 (stating that sharing information has advantages from both 
patent and trade secrecy law:  publishing fundamental knowledge about biologics 
manufacturing processes through patent law, while fostering licensing through trade 
secrecy).  Similarly, reverse-engineering can explore alternative methodology, which 
ultimately may be cost-effective or therapeutically superior.  Id. at 1049. 
 255. See Stroud, supra note 88, at 638 (advocating for degrees of regulator stringency, 
or a sliding scale, depending upon a biologics product classification system). 
 256. 21 C.F.R. § 316.3(b)(3) (2015); see Dudzinski, supra note 75, at 201.  By creating 
an alternative orphan drug regulatory pathway, the legislature recognizes varying degrees 
of quality and the importance of incentivizing hard-to-manufacture drugs. 
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certainty and efficiency, provide manufacturers with the incentive to 
invest in therapeutically advantageous processes. 
C. Incentivizing Biologicals Manufacturers with an Exclusivity Tier System 
The pharmaceutical industry, compared to other industries like hi-tech, 
spends much more on R&D but with intimidating rates of failure.257  To 
overcome these high barriers to entry, biologics and biosimilars 
manufacturers must have the fiscal incentive to innovate and the 
knowledge that new, proven manufacturing achievements will provide 
additional ROI.  Currently, the FDA rarely grants market exclusivity 
privileges for manufacturing process improvements alone; hence, 
manufacturing processes—or at least large portions thereof—are typically 
withheld as trade secrets or strategically claimed within companion 
composition claims.258  As a result, significant opportunity exists in 
regulatory framework to incentivize R&D of biologics manufacturing 
processes.  After all, every biopharmaceutical compound is not created 
equal, so why should their exclusivity grant durations all be equal? 
Innovation saves both patients and insurance companies from 
substantial cost while reducing governmental healthcare 
expenditures.259  Just as legislatures reinforce collaborative drug 
development research, they also should reinforce research, 
development, and implementation of collaborative innovative 
manufacturing methodology—especially with respect to 
biopharmaceuticals, which provide large societal health implications.  
Legislatures could directly reinforce collaboration by providing 
incentives to adhere to a more robust biologic disclosure system.260  Even 
though longstanding executive branch policies have impaired politically-
                                               
 257. Price, Making Do in Making Drugs, supra note 103, at 785. 
 258. Id. at 523. 
 259. See Price, Innovation Policy Failures, supra note 8, at 343 (“[E]xpenditures on 
drugs make up over [fifteen] percent of health care costs . . . ; see also id. at 346 
(estimating that reducing manufacturing inefficiency could save fifteen to ninety 
billion dollars annually worldwide; in the United States, that could result in 
consumer surplus gains of $47.4 billion annually or increased R&D health gains 
worth $574 billion annually). 
 260. Tucker & Wells, supra note 39, at 101 (“The BPCIA contains a number of 
exclusivity provisions designed to reward innovation in developing biologics and 
encourage future research and development; see Price, Making Do in Making Drugs, 
supra note 103, at 497, 509 (asserting that “calibrated policy successfully drives 
innovation in drug discovery and development, but not in drug manufacturing,” 
which is why disclosure and discourse must be economically incentivized). 
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driven innovation,261 the Obama Administration has recently 
emphasized that when the government is needed to “help spur 
technological advances and broaden technology adoption . . . the 
Federal Government can help catalyze advances, promote market-based 
innovation, and encourage more competitive market outcomes.”262 
Disclosure axiomatically drives innovation.263  All designs—not just 
follow-ons and biobetters—use some sort of prior art discourse to 
their advantage combined with their own innovative capabilities.  A 
robust disclosure-incentive system revolves around the four- and 
twelve-year exclusivity provisions outlined in the BPCIA.264  
Essentially, the sponsor will disclose the minimum information 
necessary to enable someone skilled in the art to understand the 
novelty of the biological manufacturing processes.  Thus, disclosure 
during the patent filing and protection process is the rate-
determining step for innovation built upon prior art. 
However, trade secrecy provides value through predictability and 
should not be abandoned completely for increased discourse.265  Trade 
secret protection is a compromise with the legislature on which the four- 
and twelve-year exclusivity valuations are built:  originators will disclose 
only what the government can economically entice the originator to 
                                               
 261. Merges & Nelson, supra note 7, at 840, 842. 
 262. Price & Rai, supra note 253, at 1059 (quoting Memorandum from Aneesh 
Chopra, U.S. Chief Tech. Officer, Office of Sci. & Tech. Policy, et al., to the Heads of 
Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies 2 (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.iccsafe.org/gr/Documents/ 
AdoptionToolkit/FedStandardsMemo-011712.pdf (identifying health-care technology 
as a national priority). 
 263. Price & Rai, supra note 42, at 189. 
 264. Tucker & Wells, supra note 39, at 101 (“The BPCIA restricts a follow-on 
manufacturer from filing an application until four years after approval of the reference 
biologic . . . [and] further provides the reference manufacturer with a 12-year [market] 
exclusivity period, during which the FDA cannot approve an FOB relying on the 
innovator’s prior showing of safety, purity, and potency for approval.”). 
 265. See Love & Seaman, supra note 170, at 14 n.65 (reinforcing use of the prior 
user defense, such that trade secrecy provides a limited window of enforceable rights, 
prior to patenting).  Section 112 of the Patent Act requires “[t]he specification shall 
contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of 
making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any 
person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly 
connected, to make and use the same . . . .”  35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).  Otherwise, 
non-enabling disclosures are of very little value to the public and do not allow 
researchers to verify whether the product is identical to the originator; see also Price, 
Innovation Policy Failures, supra note 8, at 351 (explaining that “trade secrecy creates 
incentives for innovation by keeping others from copying the innovation and 
therefore allow[s] supracompetitive pricing”). 
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disclose.  Just as there is no Takings Clause issue when legislation 
provides notice of the required patent dance and aBLA application 
criteria, the government must allow originators to withhold certain trade 
secrets when it is a viable and legitimate business option.266 
Holistically, innovation through disclosure occurs by one of three 
methods:  (1) mandating disclosure, (2) incentivizing 
discourse/disclosure through market exclusivity periods, or (3) 
letting applicants meet bare minimum requirements from USPTO 
and aBLA statutory standards.  The manner in which these methods 
impact society267 and how the impact can be tailored through the 
FDA’s grant of market exclusivity are examined below. 
1. Incentive scheme must be capable of responding to scientific improvements 
For the biologics and biosimilars market to gain acceptance and 
accelerate market growth of biopharmaceuticals—bolstering 
investments and innovation within the field—the public must view these 
therapies as safer and of higher quality.268  Biopharmaceuticals have the 
opportunity to be a therapeutically superior product relative to small-
molecule drugs.269  Viewing these medications as superior270 and worth 
consumers’ financial investments makes sense, but with so much money 
at stake, it also requires transparency.271  Patients, driven by market 
                                               
 266. However, it is critical to recognize the trade-off:  the rights and protections 
provided by patents in return for enabled disclosure. 
 267. Price, Regulating Secrecy, supra note 33, at 1775. 
 268. See supra text accompanying notes 74–81. 
 269. See Tkaczuk & Jacobs, supra note 56, at 3, 6 (discussing that “[g]uidance 
documents and position statements from established societies worldwide have the 
potential to help clinicians, payers, and providers understand” and inform patients of 
biological and biosimilar product treatments). 
 270. The sole purpose of these clinical trials should be proving superiority.  
Dranitsaris et al., supra note 49, at 482 (stating that designing current clinical trials 
revolves around equivalence; in an equivalence trial, neither superiority nor 
inferiority can be tested). 
 271. Overall, consumer and physician decisions, in conjunction with organizations 
like ExpressScripts, inherently consider clinical trials and the transparency of trial 
requirements and results.  See, e.g., id. at 483 (asserting that non-inferiority trials are 
useful for assessing further product investments, because they test whether the new 
treatment is at least non-inferior to the control, and if it is, the superiority 
hypothesis—which attempts to determine if the experimental group is better than 
the control—can be evaluated).  “[N]on-inferiority trials are efficient because a 
definitive conclusion can be made about a new drug from a single randomized trial,” 
enabling manufacturers to facilitate product investment decisions and translate the 
underlying value of these decisions to consumers, thereby justifying product pricing 
with respect to safety, efficacy, and purity.  Id. 
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forces, will seek to determine (with their physicians) which medications 
are cost-effective.  Safety and efficacy transparency will enhance public 
health by improving informed health decision making.  Furthermore, 
the public’s trust in regulatory oversight and the pharmaceutical market 
will help drive large cross-border clinical trials for rare diseases, adding 
opportunities for innovation and market approval.272 
Market acceptance requires an equity analysis because of 
disclosure.  Pioneers must enjoy a level of reassurance that disclosure 
will not impede their ability to recoup an initial investment.273  Patent 
scope requirements274 consider and balance these trade-offs for BLAs 
and aBLAs.275  Striking the right balance between disclosure and 
patent scope will ultimately drive biologics research, and a tiered 
system is a step in the right direction.276 
Lastly, the scientific state of biologics and their manufacturing 
processes develop at an alarmingly quick rate.277  Clearly, natural 
                                               
 272. Price & Minssen, supra note 246, at 685. 
 273. A pioneer would likely need to go beyond a demonstration of “substantial 
equivalence” to win over consumers in a way that would allow them to recover their 
investment.  See Wang & Smith, supra note 193, at 616 (“[A] determination of 
‘substantial equivalence’ may involve data that falls far short of the clinical testing or 
experience often required to demonstrate [a] health benefit to the satisfaction of 
CMS . . . .”).  When assessing Medicare coverage of new products or services, there is 
a required “reasonable and necessary” assessment of the new diagnosis or treatment.  
42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a) (2012).  If substantial equivalence data fall short of being 
reasonable and necessary, then investments will be for naught. 
 274. See David J. Kappos & Stuart Graham, The Case for Standard Measures of Patent 
Quality, 53 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 19, 19 (2012) [hereinafter Standard Measures of 
Patent Quality] (explaining that a patent application involves “a series of claims that 
attempts to describe new and nonobvious processes, machines, manufacturing 
methods or composition of matter” and that “quality” and therefore patent 
specifications and descriptions are the top priority of every patent office). 
 275. The patent versus trade secrecy dilemma reflects the highly scientific 
character of the biologics industry.  Systemic problems of innovation and 
competition need to be considered and addressed by innovators during their 
decision-making process. 
 276. Merges & Nelson, supra note 7, at 843. 
 277. Inevitably, more manufacturers will assess whether they can meet 
biosimilarity standards before designing a pioneer drug trial; thus, the scientific state 
of methodology for determining biosimilarity will most likely impact the speed at 
which biologics science develops.  See Strand & Cronstein, supra note 36, at 221 
(examining amino acid composition, terminal amino acid sequence of 
protein/peptide, presence of disulfide bonds, sulfhydryl groups glycosylation, 
protein folding, and some higher order structure profiles; because these tests 
examine acceptable batch-to-batch variation, they will need to be employed and 
advanced in every manufacturing setting, at every production run). 
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“drift” of manufacturing processes allows sponsors to explore 
additional novel claims; however, innovators must value these claims 
and pursue protection or exclusivity in accordance with their impact 
to societal health.278  Still, biologics manufacturers possess a 
consistent fear of reverse-engineering, which continues to plague the 
patent landscape.279  As scientific knowledge of biologics and their 
manufacturing processes increase, the cost of independently 
discovering or reverse-engineering originator manufacturing designs 
will diminish.280  Superior analytical techniques will establish a 
stronger conceptual base of knowledge.  Improved analytical 
techniques are particularly important for biologics and biosimilars 
manufacturing processes because accurate measurements of process 
improvements allow a sponsor to quantitatively predict 
enhancements in the product and to societal health.  Because process 
improvements correspond to structural differences, innovative 
analytical techniques will help render claimed material novel.  
However, innovative opportunities for biologicals manufacturing will 
not flourish unless the current market exclusivity incentive structure 
adapts. 
                                               
 278. See McCamish & Woollett, supra note 4, at 409 (determining that, because an 
originator product varies over its lifetime, batch-to-batch variability, a.k.a. drift-
assessments, provide opportunities for innovators to test manufacturing design 
alterations, which can ultimately improve safety, purity, efficacy, or cost); see also Bui 
et al., supra note 34, at 5 (providing an overview of the manufacturing variability 
guidelines set by the International Conference on Harmonization (ICH)). 
 279. The law does not penalize or bar discovery of the trade secret through 
reverse engineering, independent laboratory research, canvassing published 
literature, or inadvertent disclosure by the holder.  By promoting ethical behavior 
among competing businesses, trade secrecy prohibits and penalizes 
misappropriation:  unauthorized disclosure or use of another’s trade secret when the 
information is obtained by improper means or through a breach of confidence.  See 
supra Part III; see also ILG Indus. v. Scott, 273 N.E.2d 393, 398 (Ill. 1971) (discussing 
that “trade secrets can often be discovered by lawful means” and the difficulty in 
ascertaining whether something is a trade secret). 
 280. Trade secret protection can be easily lost through independent discovery, 
reverse engineering, or inadvertent disclosure.  “Thus, inventors with discoveries that 
are eligible for patent protection are likely to seek such protection rather than 
relying on the more mercurial protection of trade secrecy.”  Burk, supra note 230, at 
127–28 (citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 490 (1974)); see also 
supra note 92 (explaining that improving manufacturability and prior art 
classification will entice inventors to apply for patents earlier in the biologics 
development life-cycle). 
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2. Make-it or break-it with market exclusivity 
The FDA’s grant of market exclusivity directly influences originators’ 
and applicants’ analysis of ROI.  In return for regulator-facilitated 
disclosure, biologics—whether biobetter or simply novel—are provided 
with a twelve-year market exclusivity,281 four years of which an 
innovator cannot attempt to develop upon the patented material in 
conjunction with RPS clinical trial data.282  There are no Takings 
Clause concerns when notice of disclosure is accompanied by 
regulatory benefits.283  Thus, the BPCIA provides reasonable 
“investment-backed expectations,” which must be anticipated when 
applying for patent or biological product protection and exclusivity.284 
Besides grants of market exclusivity in return for disclosure, patent 
protection provides exclusive rights, requiring significant time and 
money to reduce to practice.  Thus, there needs to be an originator-
to-innovator advantage:  originators who actively innovate upon their 
existing patent and exclusivity grants, as opposed to originators who 
cling to the same manufacturing process claimed in their original 
application.  Originators possess valuable scientific and process 
knowledge, which is not easily translated through applications and 
claimed inventions.285  Originators are highly capable of using their 
                                               
 281. Overley, supra note 145 (explaining that requiring biosimilar notice in all 
circumstances would essentially extend the twelve or twelve-and-a-half year exclusivity 
because it is highly unlikely a biosimilar will be licensed under the BPCIA without 
being officially approved for sale). 
 282. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(B) (2012); see supra notes 87–91 and accompanying 
text. 
 283. Epstein, supra note 94, at 296, 313; see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of 
New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (examining the character of the government 
action, the economic impact of the action, and whether the government action has 
vitiated reasonable investment-backed expectations—which is often the central focus 
of regulatory takings analyses); Amgen Inc. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., 580 F.3d 
1340, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (acknowledging that the structure and function of a 
prior art was difficult to reproduce and verify, illustrating that a change in process 
apparently created a different structure, rendering the claimed material novel). 
 284. Epstein, supra note 94, at 303.  Validity determinations—enablement, written 
description, and definiteness—are measured at the time of filing, whereas equivalents 
are measured at the time of infringement; thus, consideration of after-arising 
technologies would not be considered a reasonable investment-backed decision. 
 285. See Biobetters Versus Biosimilars, supra note 4 (explaining that repurposing 
and/or streamlining an innovator’s manufacturing facility to support biobetter 
production offers efficiency and economics of scale advantages).  Similarly, because 
“downstream process optimization” parameters are often withheld as trade secrets, 
the originator possesses vital and valuable process-specific knowledge.  See Paul A. 
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existing knowledge to improve upon their own claimed, prior art.  
Similarly, a pioneer’s manufacturing process and product investment is 
reduced to practice when their patent provides clear, enabled 
descriptions—applicants rely upon the strength of previous patents to 
provide strong scientific knowledge to build upon.286  Otherwise, 
applicants essentially build biologics manufacturing processes from 
scratch, resulting in “unnecessary and wasteful duplication of creative 
effort.”287  Any “saved” money, or lower financial burden, will be directed 
towards developing and protecting established rights—critical to both 
innovators and applicants.  Ultimately, there is a lower regulatory barrier 
to protecting improvements upon existing claims, and these companies 
can employ offensive strategies to protect their drug portfolio.288  
Conservation of manufacturing process knowledge through robust 
disclosure systems and originator-to-innovator incentives enables the 
PTO to more accurately assess patent scope and strength;289 thus, the 
originator and/or applicant will enjoy an enhanced level of protection 
and the cycle of reinforcing innovation upon existing patent claims 
                                               
Calvo, Choosing Between Patent and Trade Secret Protection in a Biosimilar World, 
BIOSIMILAR DEV. (Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.biosimilardevelopment.com/doc/choos 
ing-between-patent-and-trade-secret-protection-in-a-biosimilar-world-0001. 
 286. See Anderson, supra note 167, at 966 (“[O]verall investment is reduced when 
patent strength is increased for inventions in which secrecy is a viable option.”); see 
also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (emphasizing the 
importance of circulating the information contained in a patent to those who are 
“skilled in the trade” for the public good, in order to “stimulate ideas and the 
eventual development of further significant advances in the art”). 
 287. Standard Measures of Patent Quality, supra note 274, at 20.  Still, the non-
rivalrous and non-excludable nature of patents allows disclosed claims to become 
retrofitted into new processes, thereby imperfectly—and potentially ingeniously—
imitating prior art. 
 288. Price, Making Do in Making Drugs, supra note 103, at 527, 544 (assuming 
valuable or high quality by design, “public disclosure required by a patent can lower 
that entry barrier by providing information about both the biologic-specific 
manufacturing process and general manufacturing processes for biologics”).  
Aranesp, a biobetter of EPO, was launched prior to EPO’s patent expiration, and as a 
result Amgen was able to maintain much of its market share after patent expiration.  
Biobetters Versus Biosimilars, supra note 4. 
 289. See Standard Measures of Patent Quality, supra note 274, at 20 (stating that an 
essential role of the government, with respect to supporting scientific and 
commercial innovation, is to properly define and enforce property rights); id. at 22 
(searching for prior art and making novelty and obviousness determinations are the 
most important standards for assessing patent scope during the examination 
process). 
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would repeat.  Accordingly, disclosure will simultaneously promote 
oversight through transparency and labor mobility.290 
However, understanding why regulator-facilitated disclosure may 
not incentivize innovation ensures these limitations are mitigated 
through other means.291  Originators and innovators rarely invest in 
new uses for their approved drug unless they can be ensured 
sufficient exclusivity after approval.  Additionally, disclosure severely 
limits the patentability of new uses designed by follow-on applicants, 
both because of dominant patents and prior art (novelty, 
obviousness, and anticipation) issues.  Like the originator-innovator 
advantage, the exclusivity scheme should provide proportionate 
advantages to originators of biological products in return for 
manufacturing innovation. 
3. Capitalizing on scientific developments requires an adaptable market 
exclusivity landscape 
Societal health is enhanced when patients benefit from 
scientifically superior medications earlier on in their treatments.  
Recurring opportunities for grants of data exclusivity within 42 U.S.C. 
§ 262(k)(7)(B), subject to case-by-case extensions, will create 
frequent fiscally justified process reassessment schemes.  Altering data 
exclusivity durations by applying a tiered system similarly creates a 
much-needed drastic change in the biologics and biosimilars 
patenting landscape. 
Any potential solution must target lowering barriers while 
maintaining safety and incentivizing innovation.292  Ultimately, drug 
development and protection costs can be lowered by combining the 
socially useful aspects of disclosure with the return on innovative 
manufacturing processes provided by secrecy.  Granting one to four 
additional years of data exclusivity during a biologics’ market 
exclusivity period will incentivize applicants to pursue exclusivity 
                                               
 290. Decreasing the importance of secrecy and associated non-disclosure and non-
compete agreements promotes labor mobility.  See generally Victor M. Harding, Trade 
Secrets and the Mobile Employee, 22 BUS. LAW. 395, 396, 407 (1967) (illustrating the 
axiomatic risk that employees face when working “in an area where he may make use 
of his former employer’s trade secrets,” especially due to the fact that “[y]ounger 
employees and engineers have the least sense of loyalty” and more commonly move 
from job-to-job in the same industry).  Similarly, enhanced levels of disclosure allow 
industry manufacturers and physicians to police the market and assess market 
deficiencies or opportunities for themselves.  See supra notes 28, 271. 
 291. See generally Price & Minssen, supra note 246. 
 292. Price, Innovation Policy Failures, supra note 8, at 352. 
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grants commensurate with their investment and clinical data 
strength.293  Every biopharmaceutical must be approved as safe and 
effective, but the investment and societal health impact vary with 
each drug.  A tiered system, with application specific regulatory 
oversight, will properly reflect each biopharmaceutical’s value with 
respect to societal health improvement. 
Furthermore, potentially longer exclusivity periods will bolster 
collaboration.  A collaborative R&D group would create a fast-track of 
biological product development,294 but it must consider issues involving 
public rights to use this knowledge.295  With sufficient ex ante incentives 
for members of the collaborative research group, public domain 
knowledge can spill over to societal health, benefitting us all.296 
High-quality innovation also would combat previous 
pharmaceutical manufacturing deficiencies and ensure that the 
biological product market is poised for rapid innovation.297  High-
quality innovation requires manufacturers to constantly reassess and 
build new continuous manufacturing, monitoring, and quality-testing 
                                               
 293. Correlating terms with innovative inputs and value outputs.  This provides 
manufacturers with both more opportunity, less risk, and more predictability. 
 294. See Margie Patlak, Competitors Try Collaboration to Speed Drug Development, 102 J. 
NAT’L CANCER INST. 841, 842 (2010) (“[T]he increasing complexity, amount of data, 
and downstream effects on regulatory science is leading to the dawning realization 
that nobody is smarter than everybody.”); Roe, supra note 4, at S28 (explaining that 
in 2011, the National Comprehensive Cancer Network formed the Biosimilars Work 
Group, taking a multi-professional approach to producing a consensus statement for 
biosimilar implementation in the clinical practice); see also Patlak, supra, at 841–42 
(describing how Merck and AstraZeneca joined forces to test a combination 
treatment with two compounds, which provided a competitive advantage and 
enabled the product to be developed more rapidly; they shared any intellectual 
property resulting from collaboration but each kept the intellectual property rights 
to their compound). 
 295. Price & Minssen, supra note 246, at 685; see also On Assignment:  Hacking 
Cancer, supra note 21 (“What if we had a system where all of the intellectual property 
could be shared amongst the scientists so the breakthrough made in one place could 
be used by someone in another place?” (quote appears at 8:22 in video)).  The NIST 
initiatives to use public-private consortia to generate fundamental knowledge and 
place it in the public domain are likely to yield substantial benefits for both 
competition and innovation. 
 296. See Roe, supra note 4, at S29 (suggesting that cost-savings driven by biosimilars for 
supportive care will incentivize innovators to invest in treatments to manage the cancer). 
 297. See Price, Innovation Policy Failures, supra note 8, at 344–45 (“[M]anufacturing 
is largely noninnovative and relies on outdated techniques and processes.”); see also 
supra note 252 and accompanying text. 
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into the process.298  Additionally, there must be low process rigidity to 
ensure manufacturers are incentivized to continue research and 
development upon prior art.299  Manufacturers should not feel secure 
when they can reap an ROI while sitting on their patent rights and 
exclusivity periods—a system meant to constantly build upon 
innovation of prior art.  Constant innovation can be accomplished by 
creating a separate validation pathway for process improvements, 
requiring disclosure when firms fail to maintain manufacturing 
quality standards (resulting in drug shortages),300 and eliminating the 
“pay-for-delay” scenario when societal health benefits are minimal.301  
Similarly, increased regulatory flexibility should be provided to 
manufacturers through the BPCIA.302 
Originators and innovators who have demonstrated excellence and 
sound manufacturing process characterization should be the first to 
capitalize upon exclusivity and patent protection.303  For instance, in 
2010, Brazil developed a regulatory pathway dependent upon 
biosimilar complexity with a corresponding amount of evidence 
required to support efficacy and safety.304  Likewise, the FDA should 
create a tiered system; exclusivity grants should be proportional to 
the anticipated (and proven) societal health benefits, which may vary 
during an exclusivity period.  This would ensure that innovators with 
sufficient capital are incentivized to invest additional resources where 
they provide the greatest value:  improving prior user rights.  Even if 
                                               
 298. Price, Innovation Policy Failures, supra note 8, at 345.  “Consistent quality, 
smaller facilities, and reduced capital and operating costs” highlight the advantages 
of continuous biopharmaceutical manufacturing.  Continuous Biopharmaceutical 
Manufacturing:  Can It Live up to the Hype?, INT’L SOC’Y FOR PHARMACEUTICAL 
ENGINEERING (Jan. 4, 2017), http://blog.ispe.org/continuous-biopharmaceutical-
manufacturing-can-it-live-up-to-the-hype (hypothesizing that a 150,000-liter fed batch 
capacity typically requires ten, 15,000-liter stainless steel reactors, while a continuous 
process could function with ten, 1000-liter reactors). 
 299. Price, Innovation Policy Failures, supra note 8, at 344–45.  In areas of rapidly evolving 
science and incomplete knowledge, regulation itself must be dynamic and adaptive. 
 300. See Matthew DeCamp et al., Chemotherapy Drug Shortages in Pediatric Oncology:  A 
Consensus Statement, 133 PEDIATRICS e716, e718 (2014). 
 301. Blackstone & Fuhr, supra note 51, at 7; see also Tucker & Wells, supra note 39, 
at 102–03 (providing an overview on reverse-payment schemes). 
 302. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 303. See Price, Innovation Policy Failures, supra note 8, at 352–53 (modeling after the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s Voluntary Protection Programs). 
 304. Tkaczuk & Jacobs, supra note 56, at S6 (noting that this scheme is meant to 
incentivize innovation and increase utilization and the market for development of 
biosimilars). 
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innovators fall short of meeting all statutory requirements for a 
patent or for protection under the BPCIA, proving enhanced efficacy 
or manufacturing efficiency must still be incentivized when the 
manufacturing process alteration potentially improves societal health.  
Tailoring rewards for both cost input and value output help properly 
reward and incentivize innovation.305  Thus, these innovators should 
be able to fall back on, for example, a change in dosing regimen306 
when it allows the drug to reach more or different classes of patients 
and therefore supports an FDA grant of additional data exclusivity 
illustrating societal health enhancement. 
Lastly, Congress should create a framework that mandates 
innovation in return for market exclusivity307 or continued patent 
validity.308  Because competition within the FOB market is expected 
to closely resemble brand-to-brand, small-molecule pharmaceutical 
competition, innovation may not occur as organically with new 
entrants in the generics market.309  Encouraging innovation, however, 
will ensure quality-by-design processes310 and reinforce follow-on 
manufacturers’ development of innovative analytical tools to 
quantitatively measure improved quality. 
Ultimately the only value that matters during the patent versus 
trade secret decision-making process is whether the 
originator/applicant feels they can obtain an ROI and capture 
market share to set-up prospective growth.311  Biologics 
                                               
 305. See Sorscher, supra note 17, at 302. 
 306. Biobetters Versus Biosimilars, supra note 4 (eluding to biobetters potentially 
being a “once-a-day” dosing regime, which could treat the same indications “but in a 
better and smarter way”). 
 307. Regulatory exclusivity for manufacturing methods may provide the industry 
with the extra inertia to innovate.  See Price, Innovation Policy Failures, supra note 8, at 
349 (arguing that, currently, regulatory exclusivity has only played a role in drug 
development and not for manufacturing methods); see also Price & Rai, supra note 
42, at 189 (incentivizing disclosure with accelerated review and mandating disclosure 
attempts to increase competition and innovation). 
 308. Tucker & Wells, supra note 39, at 104 (recognizing “that brand reformulation 
strategies (often called ‘product hopping’ or ‘evergeening’)” may result in “change[s] in 
safety, purity, or potency”); see also Levy, supra note 235, at 276–79 (laying out how generic 
firms may succeed on antitrust claims based on a product hopping). 
 309. Tucker & Wells, supra note 39, at 101–02. 
 310. See Price, Innovation Policy Failures, supra note 8, at 346 (asserting that “quality 
through testing creates major inefficiencies and slows the production” while quality 
by design builds quality into the manufacturing process). 
 311. Potentially creating an independent pathway to validate new technologies 
outside of the NDA and BLA process would provide ROI viability options.  Id. at 353.  
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manufacturing processes and the analytical tools that quantitatively 
compare biological products are the backbone of innovation in the 
biological products market.  Because precision medications and rare 
disease treatments require high initial investments, which are not 
properly incentivized within the BPCIA, the biologics landscape is 
poised for change.  The FDA will play a crucial role, both by regulating 
adaptively and by incentivizing disclosure proportional to high-quality 
innovation.312  As science and technology advances, applicants will 
possess more data to characterize the biopharmaceutical they are 
disclosing; however, competitors will simultaneously need less 
information to innovate upon prior art.  Therefore, data exclusivity 
grants are particularly important over the next couple decades for 
ensuring consumers have the opportunity to use cheaper, biobetter 
medicines in the rare disease medication market. 
CONCLUSION 
Generally, the pharmaceutical market can be divided into two types 
of drugs:  (1) small-molecule chemical compounds and (2) large 
complex molecule biologics.  Descriptively, biologic chemotherapies, 
such as Herceptin and Rituxan, are referred to as “smart bombs,” no 
doubt because of their advantageous structural and functional make-
up.  However, because of biologics’ complex, large molecule nature, it 
is impossible to make an exact copy of a biologic; unlike small-
molecule chemical compounds where generic replicates can be made, 
the best an FOB can hope for is a “biosimilar” label.  R&D costs are 
high because of biologics complex structure and manufacturing 
difficulties.  Thus, the BPCIA must incentivize biological product 
enhancements—whether developed by the reference product or the 
FOB sponsor—that result from improved manufacturing processes, 
producing consistent, lower priced options for consumers. 
The proposed incentive structure within 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(B) 
incentivizes a sponsor to pursue a ROI in accordance with specific 
attributes of its manufacturing process.  Within the current scheme, it is 
feasible for a biosimilar to be similar enough to qualify as a biosimilar 
under the BPCIA but not similar enough to be covered by a patent 
claim.  Thus, pioneer manufacturers should take care in obtaining valid, 
optimal claims that afford broad patent protection of their biologics. 
                                               
For examples of how biosimilars and biobetters are likely to dynamically and 
strategically capture market share, see Biobetters Versus Biosimilars, supra note 4. 
 312. Manufacturing Barriers, supra note 253, at 1063. 
ELEVI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/2017  6:37 PM 
970 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:911 
Until now, the pharmaceutical industry has focused on patents that 
protect the drug itself rather than methods of its manufacture.  
However, if manufacturers could renew their data exclusivity period in 
return for manufacturing improvements and additional scientific 
disclosure, consumers will reap the benefits.  Additionally, by creating a 
one- to four-year data exclusivity extension opportunity, manufacturers 
will feel more comfortable reinvesting their ROI in manufacturing 
efficiency and manufacturers can capitalize on the complex-molecule 
nature of their biologic by exploring manufacturing drift. 
Biologics developed through biotechnology constitute an essential 
part of the pipeline for medicines available to patients today and 
continue to grow at an increasing rate.  The legislature should 
reinforce innovation and adaptation in this evolving area of science 
by providing incentives for a more robust biologic disclosure system. 
The manufacturing processes used to develop biologics are highly 
valuable; some processes are protected as trade secrets while others 
are subject to patent protection.  Biologics are developing in 
response to the inefficiencies of small-molecule pharmaceuticals, so it 
is increasingly important that the biologics market does not suffer 
from the same stagnation.  By shifting manufacturers’ focus from the 
risks of competition to the advantages of data exclusivity, more 
consumers will prescribe to the value of biologics for their own 
ailments and the same inefficiencies that plagued the small-molecule 
pharmaceutical market will be eliminated. 
